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The Strength of Statistical Evidence for
Composite Hypotheses: Inference to the Best
Explanation
David R. Bickel

Abstract

A general function to quantify the weight of evidence in a sample of data for
one hypothesis over another is derived from the law of likelihood and from a statistical formalization of inference to the best explanation. For a fixed parameter
of interest, the resulting weight of evidence that favors one composite hypothesis
over another is the likelihood ratio using the parameter value consistent with each
hypothesis that maximizes the likelihood function over the parameter of interest.
Since the weight of evidence is generally only known up to a nuisance parameter,
it is approximated by replacing the likelihood function with a reduced likelihood
function on the interest parameter space. Unlike the Bayes factor and unlike the
p-value under interpretations that extend its scope, the weight of evidence is coherent in the sense that it cannot support a hypothesis over any hypothesis that it
entails. Further, when comparing the hypothesis that the parameter lies outside a
non-trivial interval to the hypothesis that it lies within the interval, the proposed
method of weighing evidence almost always asymptotically favors the correct hypothesis under mild regularity conditions. Even at small sample sizes, replacing a
simple hypothesis with an interval hypothesis substantially reduces the probability of observing misleading evidence. Sensitivity of the weight of evidence to hypotheses’ specification is mitigated by making them imprecise. The methodology
is illustrated in the multiple comparisons setting of gene expression microarray
data, and issues with simultaneous inference and multiplicity are addressed.

Version note
This revision of Bickel (2008) was last modied in content on 10 June 2010 and
was uploaded to COBRA on 13 September 2010.
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Introduction

1.1 Decision-theoretic inference and evidential inference
Current needs to evaluate evidence over thousands of hypotheses in genomics
and data mining reopen the question of how to quantify the strength of evidence.
Some of the most pronounced dierences between inferences made by methods
based on coverage or error frequencies and by other statistical methods occur
in the realm of multiple comparisons, giving new importance to old debates on
the foundations of statistics.
Each of the two main frameworks of statistical inference rests on solid
decision-theoretic foundations.

In the most-developed frequentist framework,

that of Neyman and Pearson, the practice of deciding to reject only those hypotheses with valid p -values falling below a xed signicance level strictly controls the rate of Type I errors.

In the most-developed Bayesian framework,

that of F. P. Ramsey (cited in Jereys (1948)), de Finetti (1970), and Savage
(1954), the concept of coherent decision-making leads to probability as a measure of belief in the sense that it increases monotonically with how much the
rational decision-maker would wager on its truth given the available information
and a xed loss function, prior distribution, and model. The methods of both
frameworks nd direct applications to problems requiring some degree of automatic decision-making. For example, the Neyman-Pearson framework provides
rules deciding when a clinical trial is successful or when to stop an unsuccessful
trial, and the Bayes-Ramsey framework enables e-mail lters to decide which
messages are unwanted.
The methods of these decision-theoretic frameworks have been adapted to
problems requiring reports of the strength of the evidence in the data supporting
one hypothesis over another rather than automated decisions to reject one hypothesis in favor of another. Bayes factors have long been advocated as measures
of the strength of statistical evidence (e.g., Jereys (1948); Kass and Raftery
(1995)). Accordingly, Osteyee and Good (1974) considered the logarithm of the
Bayes factor the weight of evidence for one hypothesis over another.

This

seems reasonable since the Bayes factor is equal to the posterior odds divided
by the prior odds. ( Weight of evidence is instead used herein as an abbreviation
for strength of statistical evidence .)
Likewise, p -values from methods designed to control the rate of Type I (false
positive) errors are routinely interpreted in the scientic literature as measures
of evidence favoring alternative hypotheses over null hypotheses. Although the
comparison of a p -value to a previously xed level of signicance to make a decision on rejecting a null hypothesis is common in clinical trials, in less regulated
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elds, the p -value is more often interpreted as a measure of evidence or support
that a sample of data provides about a statistical hypothesis.

Wright (1992)

put it simply, "The smaller the p -value, the stronger the evidence against the
null hypothesis." This use by Fisher of the p -value to quantify the degree of
consistency of the data with the null hypothesis is called signicance testing to
sharply distinguish it from its use by Neyman to decide whether to reject the
null hypothesis at a previously xed Type I error rate (Cox, 1977). Among the
examples of signicance testing to be found in scientic disciplines as diverse
as biomedicine, basic neuroscience, and physics may be found the common but
theoretically unjustied practice of taking a suciently high p -value as evidence
that there is "no eect" (Spicer and Francisco, 1997; Pasterkamp et al., 2003)
and many statisticians' interpretation of a suciently low p -value as strong evidence against the null hypothesis; e.g., Fraser et al. (2004). Even the critics
of signicance testing acknowledge that it serves its purpose in some situations
(Spjøtvoll, 1977; Goodman and Royall, 1988).

1.1.1 Coherence and objectivity
In spite of the uncontested value of methods of the Neyman-Pearson and BayesRamsey frameworks in the decision-making roles for which they are optimal,
their application to quantifying the strength of statistical evidence remains controversial.

For neither the p -value nor the Bayes factor qualies as a general

measure of evidence if the strength of statistical evidence in a particular data
set for one given hypothesis over another under a specied family of probability
distributions must meet both of these criteria:



the coherence condition, that strength of evidence is always consistent
with the rules of logic;



the objectivity condition, that the strength of evidence does not vary from
one researcher to another.

Schervish (1996) and Lavine and Schervish (1999) point out that a candidate
measure of the strength of evidence is illogical or incoherent if it can assign more
support to a hypothesis than to a hypothesis it implies; candidates that cannot
do so are considered coherent. For example, an incoherent candidate might say
an observation of parents' eye colors supports the hypothesis that their child
will have brown eyes over the hypothesis that she will have either blue eyes or
brown eyes.
Schervish (1996) and Royall (1997) criticized the p -value as a measure of
support by comparing one-sided and two-sided p -values under the same family
of sampling distributions. For a scalar parameter
is tested with

θ 6= 0

and

θ>0

θ, say the null hypothesis θ = 0

as the alternative hypotheses. If the p -value of

the two-sided test is twice that of the one-sided test, then signicance testing

θ > 0 than to the hypothesis
θ > 0 ⇒ θ 6= 0. If
p -values, then θ > 0 but not θ 6= 0

would attach more evidence to the hypothesis that
that

θ 6= 0

relative to the same null hypothesis even though

the signicance level lies between the two
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would be accepted over the null hypothesis. However, this source of incoherence
only arrises if one-sided p -values are used with unbounded parameters; many
researchers as a matter of principle only use them with bounded parameters,
e.g.,

θ ≥ 0,

in eect ruling out consideration of one-sided composite hypotheses

about an unbounded parameter value.
A related instance of incoherence stems from interpreting one-sided p -values
as attained condence levels of composite hypotheses, including those concerning the value of an unbounded parameter. Since such attained condence levels
can be smaller for a region than for a region it contains (Efron and Tibshirani,
1998; Polansky, 2007, pp. 224-227), they are not coherent measures of evidence.
Lavine and Schervish (1999) likewise argued that the Bayes factor is incoher-

x of a discrete random
{fθ } of probability mass functions and the
π1 and π2 given hypotheses θ = 0 and −1 < θ < 1,

ent as a measure of evidence. Consider the observation

n-tuple X .

Based on the family

conditional prior measures

respectively, the Bayes factor

R

fθ (x) dπ1 (θ)

R1
−1

fθ (x) dπ2 (θ)

= R1
−1

f0 (x)
fθ (x) dπ2 (θ)

will be greater than 1 if the maximum likelihood estimate is suciently close
to 0 and if the prior density of

θ

is nonzero for all

θ ∈ (−1, 1).

In this case, the

logarithm of the Bayes factor as the weight of evidence would attribute more
support to

θ=0

than to

−1 < θ < 1,

and yet

θ = 0 ⇒ −1 < θ < 1.

In spite of its potential incoherence when used alone, the Bayes factor may
instead be used to compute a ratio of posterior probabilities of the hypotheses
in question, and such a ratio would satisfy the coherence condition (Lavine and
Schervish, 1999).

In the strict Bayes-Ramsey framework, however, since the

prior probability of each hypothesis varies from one decision maker to another,
the ratio of posterior probabilities violates the objectivity condition of a measure of evidence. In the applied data analysis, Bayesians rarely make the eort
required to elicit prior distributions from experts to adequately reect their levels of uncertainty about parameter values, perhaps because it is justiable in
very few practical situations. The arguably less subjective practice of automatically assigning 50% prior probability to each hypothesis sacrices coherence
by reducing the ratio of posterior probabilities to the Bayes factor. Although
the principle of insucient reason behind that practice still has its defenders

?

( ), the well known problems with partitioning the parameter set into equally
probable subsets remain (Kass and Wasserman, 1996). The Bayes factor also
requires a prior distribution if either hypothesis corresponds to more than one
parameter value or if there is a nuisance parameter. Although default priors are
much more convenient than their frankly subjective counterparts and seem to
oer more objectivity (Berger, 2004), there is no consensus on how to select one
of the many available rules for generating default priors, and yet small-sample
inference can be sensitive to such selection (Kass and Wasserman, 1996). Arguments for priors based on group invariance are compelling but do not apply
to all situations, whereas generally applicable and widely used reference pri-
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ors are functions of which parameters are of interest (Bernardo, 1979), thereby
eroding Bayes-Ramsey foundations unless the prior levels of an agent's beliefs
should depend on which parameter that agent intends to use in decision making. Regardless of the specic algorithm selected, the automatic generation of
priors introduces a problem of interpreting the resulting posterior probabilities
since the prior probabilities do not correspond to any scientist's actual levels of
belief, as a more rigorous application of Bayes-Ramsey decision theory would
require. Consequently, a default prior often serves to determine what an ideal
agent whose beliefs were encoded by that prior would believe upon observing
the data (Bernardo, 1997). If a prior is instead chosen in order to derive credible
sets that match condence intervals, using Bayesian calculations for NeymanPearson inference, objectivity and an unambiguous interpretation of probability
are thereby purchased at the price of abandoning strict Bayes-Ramsey decision
theory, except in special cases.
By contrast, the likelihood ratio satises both of the necessary conditions
for a measure of the strength of statistical evidence; it is coherent in the above
sense (Lavine and Schervish, 1999) without depending on the choice of a prior
distribution. In a philosophical study of the foundations of statistical theory,
I. Hacking proposed the law of likelihood in terms of data d and hypotheses h
and i: d supports h better than i whenever the likelihood ratio of h to i given
d exceeds 1 (Hacking, 1965, p. 71). The law is usually restated as follows. At
each value of

θ,

the

D-dimensional

f (•; θ) denotes the probability
n-tuple X of which the xed
L (•) = L (•; x) = f (•; θ) , a function

parameter,

density or probability mass function of the random

n-tuple

of observations

x is
Θ,

on the parameter space

a realization.

is called the likelihood function .

In the evidential

L (θ0 ; x) /L (θ00 ; x) is the
0
00
strength of statistical evidence in X = x that supports θ = θ over θ = θ , and if
0
00
0
00
L (θ ; x) /L (θ ; x) > 1, there is more evidence for θ = θ than for θ = θ (Royall,

framework of statistical inference, the likelihood ratio

2000a). Both hypotheses under consideration are simple in the sense that each
corresponds to a single parameter value, a point in

Θ.

In this case of two simple

log (L (θ0 ; x) /L (θ00 ; x)),
θ = θ over θ = θ00 .

hypotheses, the logarithm of the Bayes factor equals
which Edwards (1992) called the support for

0

1.1.2 Probability of misleading evidence
With the likelihood ratio as the measure of the strength of evidence, the analog of a Type I error rate plays key roles in sample size planning and in the
choice of a method of eliminating nuisance parameters without itself quantifying the strength of evidence (Strug et al., 2007; Blume, 2008).

This analog,

the probability of observing misleading evidence, is dened as follows. Consider
the strength of evidence in observed data generated by distribution

Pθ

in favor

of the false hypothesis that the data were generated by a distribution in the
set

{Pθ0 : θ0 6= θ}.

The observation of misleading evidence is the event that the

strength of evidence for the false hypothesis exceeds a xed threshold representing the boundary between weaker and stronger evidence, and the probability of

observing misleading evidence is the limiting relative frequency of observations
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of misleading evidence under repeated sampling.
Ideally, the probability of observing misleading evidence would converge to
0 with increasing sample size. In other words, more information would increase
the reliability of inferences made from the available evidence, at least asymptotically. Hypothesis testing at a xed Type I error rate fails in this regard since
measuring the strength of evidence by the p -value results in the same probability of observing misleading evidence for all samples sizes. Consequently, the
result of a conventional hypothesis test, whether expressed as a p -value or as
an accept/reject decision, cannot be evidentially interpreted without taking the
sample size into consideration, which is why a given p -value is thought to provide stronger evidence against the null hypothesis if the sample is small than if
it is large (Royall, 1997). For example, as Goodman and Royall (1988) explain,
a p -value of 0.05 in many cases corresponds to a likelihood ratio indicating overwhelming evidence in favor of the null hypothesis for suciently large samples.
For this reason, a measure of evidence is considered interpretable if the associated probability of observing misleading evidence approaches 0 asymptotically.

1.2 Evidence for a composite hypothesis
The classical law of likelihood is insucient for statistical inference if either
hypothesis is composite, that is, if it corresponds to multiple parameter values,
each an element of some

Θ0 ⊆ Θ.

This insuciency threatens to severely limit

the scope of likelihood-evidential inference since most statistical tests in common use compare a simple null hypothesis
hypothesis such as

θ>θ

00

or

θ 6= θ

00

θ = θ00

to a composite alternative

.

In some areas of application, subject-matter knowledge can inform the replacement of a composite hypothesis
in order to compute

0

00

L (θ ) /L (θ )

θ ∈ Θ0

θ

θ = θ0

as the weight of evidence. For example, in

linkage analysis, Strug and Hodge (2006) set
of the recombination fraction

with a simple hypothesis

θ0

to the smallest plausible value

for the purpose of using likelihood ratios instead

of p -values that employ composite alternative hypotheses.

In other domains,

any selection of a simple hypothesis in place of a composite hypothesis would
be unacceptably arbitrary or subjective.

Nonetheless, there may sometimes

be advantages in evidential inference to setting
close as possible to

θ00

such that

|θ0 − θ00 |

θ0

to the parameter value as

remains high enough to be practi-

cally signicant; this concept of scientic signicance was previously applied
to non-evidential gene expression data analyses (Bickel, 2004; Van De Wiel
and Kim, 2007).

An alternative is to set

θ0

to some conventional value, e.g.,

the value corresponding to a two-fold expression dierence (an expression ratio
estimate of 1/2 or 2) remains a commonly used threshold with gene expression studies in spite of its arbitrary nature (Lewin et al., 2006).

Comparing

the evidential strength of one simple hypothesis to another has the advantage

Pθ00 (L (θ0 ) /L (θ00 ) ≥ Λ), the probability of observing misleading evidence
at level Λ > 1, is asymptotically bounded by the standard normal cumulative
√
distribution function evaluated at − 2 log Λ if L is smooth and if the parameter
dimension D is xed, or by the Chebyshev or Markov bound 1/Λ more univerthat
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sally (Royall, 2000a). In addition, limiting the parameter of interest to one of
two values is convenient when planning the size of a study (Strug et al., 2007).
Nonetheless, the weight of evidence involving a composite hypothesis cannot
in general be measured or even approximated by substituting a simple hypothesis selected prior to observing the data. However, a solution to the composite hypothesis problem does appear to lie in the use of a likelihood interval
or more general likelihood set. The level- Λ likelihood set
values of
estimate.

θ

satisfying

 
L (θ) ≥ L θb /Λ,

where

θb

E (Λ)

consists of all

is the maximum likelihood

Membership in a likelihood set determines which parameter values

are considered obviously open to grave suspicion (Fisher, 1973, pp. 75-76) if
not inconsistent with the data (Barnard, 1967; Hoch and Blume, 2008). Thus,
whenever

E (Λ)

 
L θb /L (θ00 ) > Λ

θb 6= θ00 ,

are considered better supported than

reason,

 
L θb /L (θ00 )
θ ∈ E (Λ)

potheses

 
L θb /L (θ00 )
θ 6= θ

and

00

one or more parameter values in

θ = θ00

by the data, and, for that

measures the weight of evidence for the composite hy-

over the simple hypothesis

θ = θ00 .

By the same reasoning,

measures the weight of evidence for the composite hypotheses

over the simple hypothesis

θ = θ00 .

More generally, a formal interpretation of the principle of inference to the
best explanation entails that
uniquely quanties the weight
the hypothesis that

0

and

Θ

θ ∈ Θ00

in the absence of prior hypothesis probabilities,

θ
θ ∈ Θ0 is better supported than θ ∈ Θ00 if and only
supθ0 ∈Θ0 L (θ0 ; x) > supθ00 ∈Θ00 L (θ00 ; x), a conclusion a preliminary version of

where

Θ

00

W (Θ0 , Θ00 ) = supθ0 ∈Θ0 L (θ0 ) / supθ00 ∈Θ00 L (θ00 )
0
of evidence for the hypotheses that θ ∈ Θ over

are subsets of the parameter space (2). It follows that, if

is the parameter of interest,
if

the present article (Bickel, 2008) and Zhang (2009b) independently derived from
dierent axiomatic systems.
[Zhang (2009b) also recorded asymptotic properties of

W (Θ0 , Θ00 ), applied it

to several interesting examples, refuted objections against its adoption, and gave
guidelines for its derivation from statistical reports in the absence of the original data. The most important practical dierence between our two approaches
emerges in the presence of a nuisance parameter. Zhang (2009b) follows Royall
(1992) and He et al. (2007) in framing the nuisance parameter problem as a special case of the composite hypothesis problem, whereas Bickel (2008) maintains
the complete separation between the two problems (see Section 2.5).

Unique

contributions of the present paper will be summarized in Section 6.1.]
A discrepancy between the performance of the likelihood ratio for two xed
simple hypotheses and the likelihood ratio maximized over a subset of parameter
space including parameter values arbitrarily close to that of a simple hypothesis
was uncovered by the example of the multivariate normal family with a 5-

θ0 and
θ in Θ = R , there is a 2.1% upper bound on P (L (θ ) /L (θ ) > 8), the
probability of observing misleading evidence at level Λ = 8 (Royall, 2000a). By
00
contrast, the probability that the level- 8 likelihood set contains θ , assuming
it is the true value of θ, is less than 50% (Kalbeisch, 2000). This means the
dimensional mean as

00

θ

(Kalbeisch, 2000). Asymptotically, for any xed

15

θ 00

0

00
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asymptotic probability of observing misleading evidence for

00

θ ∈ R15 \ {θ00 }

over

θ = θ exceeds the asymptotic probability of observing misleading evidence for
θ = θ0 over θ = θ00 by a factor of 25 or more. This malady is not limited
to the normal case, but is symptomatic of inadequate interpretability when a
hypothesis representing practically the entire parameter space is pitted against
a simple hypothesis. The universal upper bound on

Pθ00 (L (θ0 ) /L (θ00 ) > 8)

is

12.5%, the Chebyshev or Markov bound. That is more than a factor of 4 smaller

  

Pθ00 L θb /L (θ00 ) > 8 = 52.7% in the example of D = 5 and conditions
  

b /L (θ00 ) is asymptotically distributed as χ2 with D
under which 2 log L θ
than

degrees of freedom.
Given such an asymptotic distribution,

 
L θb /L (θ00 )

does not meet the in-

terpretability condition of Section 1.1 since

  

∀Λ>1 lim Pθ00 L θb /L (θ00 ) > Λ = α
n→∞

for some

α > 0.

Thus,

 
L θb /L (θ00 )

is no more interpretable than a p -value as

the strength of evidence.
Interpretability is recovered by instead quantifying the strength of evidence
for a composite hypothesis over an interval hypothesis, e.g., for

|θ| ≤ θ+

for some xed

θ+ > 0.

|θ| > θ+

over

The proof is in Section 2. In addition to satisfy-

ing the interpretability condition, weighing evidence for composite hypotheses
has intrinsic scientic merit, as, for example, when assessing evidence for bioequivalence or dierential gene expression. Section 2 also highlights connections
between Hacking's law of likelihood, evidence sets, and evidence for or against
composite hypotheses.
For some applications, the main drawback of replacing a simple hypothesis
with an interval hypothesis is the dependence on the interval bounds. This is
largely overcome by the extension of evidential inference to handle imprecise
composite hypotheses in Section 3.
The proposed methodology is studied by simulation (4) and illustrated by
application to microarray gene expression data (5). Imprecise composite hypotheses provide a natural formalization of the imprecision inherent in what is
meant when a biologist says a gene is dierentially expressed; this imprecision
applies to dierential protein and metabolite expression as well as to dierential gene expression. [Looking over thousands of genes for dierential expression
poses an extreme multiple comparisons problem in the Neyman-Pearson framework. Because, unlike the p -value, the likelihood ratio as a measure of statistical
evidence is not based on the control of a Type I error rate, it is not adjusted
for multiple comparisons by enforcing control of a family-wise error rate or a
false discovery rate (2.4). While many statisticians see the ability to correct
for multiple tests in this way as an important advantage of the p -value over
the likelihood ratio alone (Korn and Freidlin, 2006), others maintain that the
perceived need to correct for multiple comparisons exposes a shortcoming in the
evidential interpretation of the p -value (Royall, 1997).]
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Section 6 has a discussion and opportunities for further research.

2

Inference about precise hypotheses

2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 Basic notation
The symbols

⊂ and ⊆ designate proper subsets and (possibly improper) subsets,

respectively.

Θ ⊆ R1D .
For all θ ∈ Θ, the probability distribution of the observable random n-tuple
X ∈ Ω ⊆ R1n admits a probability density or mass function f (•; θ) on Ω such
0
00
0
00
that θ 6= θ ⇒ f (•; θ ) 6= f (•; θ ). For X = x, the likelihood function on Θ is
L (•) = L (•; x) = f (x; •). Unless specied otherwise, the propositions of this
0
paper hold generally for all x in {y : y ∈ Ω, ∀θ 0 ∈Θ f (y; θ ) > 0}. Both Θ and Ω
D

Consider the xed positive integer

and the parameter space

are nonempty. If imprecise hypotheses are under consideration, the probability
distributions that determine the values of

L

2.1.2 Hypothesis types
Denition 1. For any nonempty

Θ0

is simple if

Θ

subset

are incomplete (3).

of

Θ,

the hypothesis that

0

θ ∈ Θ0
θ ∈ Θ0

has only one element; otherwise, the hypothesis that
θ ∈ Θ0 is intrinsically simple
0
if the sampling model implies that θ , conditional on θ ∈ Θ , is a random D 0
0 0
tuple of some probability space (Θ , A , p ). A composite hypothesis that is not
is composite. A simple or composite hypothesis

intrinsically simple is complex.
As will become clear in Example 6, distinguishing composite hypotheses that
are intrinsically simple from those that are complex facilitates inference about
a random

θ

distribution

with frequency distribution

π

p,

not to be confused with any prior

that is not a feature of the sampling model. Thereby dierenti-

ating the physical distribution

p

from the mental distribution

π

?

( ) plays a

crucial role in the framework of Section 2.2.

(Θ, A, p), then the hyΘ0 ∈ A\∅. To succinctly represent
0
0
the hypotheses of potential interest, let Φ = {ϕ (Θ ) : Θ ∈ A\∅} denote a parameter set isomorphic to A\∅, where ϕ is an invertible A-measurable function.

Consider the family P φ : φ ∈ Φ of probability distributions of X that admit

probability density or mass functions f (•; φ) : φ ∈ Φ satisfying
Z

0
f (x; φ ) = f (x; θ0 ) dp θ0 |θ ∈ ϕ−1 (φ0 )
(2.1)
If

θ

is in fact random with marginal probability space

pothesis

for all

θ ∈ Θ0

φ 0 ∈ Φ.

will not be of interest unless

Φ is L (•) = L (•; x) = f (x; •).
θ ∈ Θ0 under the rst family of
0
simple hypothesis φ = ϕ (Θ ) under the

Then the likelihood function on

Thus, every intrinsically simple hypothesis
sampling distributions corresponds to a

8
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new family. By contrast, a complex hypothesis cannot be reduced to a simple
hypothesis.
Whether

θ ∈ Θ0 means  θ that is in Θ0 

θ is in Θ0  may
Θ is nonempty

or the hypothesis that

be determined from the context. In the sequel, every subset of

and corresponds to either a simple hypothesis or a composite hypothesis of
potential interest. Accordingly,

Θ if θ is xed
Θ0 ∈ A\∅.

or

A\∅

if

θ

2Θ

denotes the set of all non-empty subsets of

is random, in which case all

Θ0 ⊆ Θ

stands for all

2.2 Explanatory theory of evidence
Section 2.2.1 will formalize the concept of explanatory power that will be used
in Section 2.2.2 to dene the weight of evidence. For the sake of applications,
Section 2.2.3 expresses the weight of evidence more concisely.

2.2.1 Inference to the best explanation
ex (Θ0 ) = ex (Θ0 ; x)
X = x, that is, the

Let
to

θ ∈ Θ0 with respect
θ ∈ Θ to explain why x was observed as
Θ
of X . The function ex on 2 × Ω will be

denote the explanatory power of

0

ability of

opposed to some other realization

restricted by weak conditions needed for use with the weight of evidence. To
motivate the condition that pertains specically to simple hypotheses, measures
of explanatory power proposed by Popper (2002, Appendix IX) and Niiniluoto
(2004) will exemplify the concept.

Example 2.

Niiniluoto (2004) recorded two functions that quantify the ability of

a simple hypothesis to explain data. The one that does not necessitate assigning
probabilities to hypotheses is now generalized to continuous parameter values.
Let

f (x) =

R

f (x; θ) dπ (θ),

where

π

is a non-Dirac measure on

Θ

and

f (•; θ)

is a probability mass function. Then

ex ({θ0 } ; x) =
is the explanatory power of

Example 3.

θ = θ0

f (x; θ0 ) − f (x)
1 − f (x)

with respect to

(2.2)

X = x.

Also with discrete data and parameters in mind, Popper (2002,

pp. 416, 420-421) considered

ex ({θ0 } ; x) =
ex ({θ0 } ; x) =

f (x; θ0 ) − f (x)
;
f (x; θ0 ) + f (x)


f (x; θ0 )
log2
f (x)

as two possible values of explanatory power that are equally applicable to continuous data and parameters.
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Since

ex

will only serve to rank hypotheses, the measure

π

dening

f (x)

in the examples need neither be specied nor included in the simple-hypothesis
axiom to be included in the denition of

ex.

Intrinsically simple hypotheses are

replaced with the equivalent simple hypotheses for application of that axiom.
A strong idealization of the principle of inference to the best explanation
stipulates that the simple hypothesis of highest explanatory power be inferred
(Niiniluoto, 2004). The complex-hypothesis axiom of the explanatory function

ex

weakens that idealization by stipulating only that the ability of

explain

X =x

cannot exceed that of

θ∈Θ

00

to

Θ contains a parameter
θ ∈ Θ0 or θ ∈ Θ00 is intrinsically

, where

value of highest explanatory power, unless either

θ ∈ Θ0

00

simple.
For application to both simple hypotheses and composite hypotheses according to the above sketch,

ex satises the conditions imposed by the following

recursive denition.

Denition 4.

A function

ex

on

2Θ × Ω

is an explanatory function if it satises

the following axioms:
1.

ex ({θ0 } ; x) : Θ → R1
L as θ0 ∈ Θ varies.

2. For all
00

θ∈Θ

Θ0 ⊆ Θ

and

increases monotonically with the likelihood function

Θ00 ⊆ Θ

such that each of the hypotheses

θ ∈ Θ0

and

is either simple or complex,

arg

ex ({θ} ; x) ∈ Θ00 =⇒ ex (Θ0 ; x) ≤ ex (Θ00 ; x) .

sup

(2.3)

θ∈Θ0 ∪Θ00

3. For all

Θ0 ⊆ Θ

such that

θ ∈ Θ0

is an intrinsically simple hypotheses,

ex (Θ0 ; x) = ex ({ϕ (Θ0 )} ; x)
where

ex

is an explanatory function on

(2.4)

{{φ} : φ ∈ Φ} × Ω.

Equation (2.4) says the explanatory power of an intrinsically simple hypothesis is equal to that of the equivalent simple hypothesis about the parameter in
the family of distributions induced by equation (2.1).
Violation of equation (2.3) would mean there is a simple or complex hypothesis that explains the data better than a simple or complex hypothesis that
contains the best explanation.

2.2.2 Evidential functions
W (Θ0 , Θ00 ) = W (Θ0 , Θ00 ; x) denote the weight of evidence in X = x that
0
00
supports θ ∈ Θ over θ ∈ Θ . In the terminology of Section 2.2.1, the evidential
function W is now dened in terms of the explanatory function ex that yields
ex (Θ0 ; x) as the power of the hypothesis θ ∈ Θ0 to explain why X = x.

Let

Denition 5.

A function

W

on

respect to an explanatory function

2Θ × 2Θ × Ω is an
ex if it satises the

evidential function with

following axioms:

10
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1. For all

θ0 ∈ Θ

and

θ00 ∈ Θ,
W ({θ0 } , {θ00 } ; x) =

2. For all

L (θ0 ; x)
.
L (θ00 ; x)

(2.5)

Θ0 , Θ00 , Θ000 ⊆ Θ,

W (Θ0 , Θ00 ; x) = W (Θ00 , Θ0 ; x) ⇐⇒

W (Θ0 , Θ000 ; x) = W (Θ00 , Θ000 ; x)
.
W (Θ000 , Θ0 ; x) = W (Θ000 , Θ00 ; x)

⇐⇒

(2.6)

3. For all

Θ0 , Θ00 ⊆ Θ,

W (Θ0 , Θ00 ; x) ≤ W (Θ00 , Θ0 ; x) ⇐⇒ ex (Θ0 ; x) ≤ ex (Θ00 ; x) .
4. For all

Θ0 , Θ00 ⊆ Θ

such that

θ ∈ Θ0

and

θ ∈ Θ00

(2.7)

are intrinsically simple

hypotheses,

W (Θ0 , Θ00 ; x) = W ({ϕ (Θ0 )} , {ϕ (Θ00 )} ; x)
where

W

is any evidential function on

(2.8)

2

{{φ} : φ ∈ Φ} × Ω.
W ({θ0 } , {θ00 }) is the weight
θ = θ00 ; this special law of like-

According to equation (2.5) , the likelihood ratio
of evidence in

X=x

that supports

θ=θ

0

over

lihood is restricted to the special case of simple hypotheses (1.1.1). Equation
(2.5) calibrates the weight of evidence for one simple hypothesis over another.
The special law of likelihood does not in itself specify how to weigh evidence
for or against a complex hypothesis (Royall, 2000b; Blume, 2002) unless all parameter values represented by the complex hypothesis have the same likelihood
(Royall, 1997, pp. 17-18).
By contrast, Denition 5 does apply to composite hypotheses. Specically,
the principle of inference to the best explanation idealized by equation (2.3)
extends the special law of likelihood to complex hypotheses, whereas intrinsically simple hypotheses are replaced with simple hypotheses in accordance with
equation (2.1).
Following Jereys (1948) with the weight of evidence in place of the Bayes

(b = log10 W (Θ0 , Θ00 ))
indicates weak evidence (0 < |b| < 1/2), moderate evidence (1/2 ≤ |b| < 1), strong
evidence (1 ≤ |b| < 3/2), very strong evidence (3/2 ≤ |b| < 2), or decisive evi0
00
00
dence (|b| ≥ 2) supporting θ ∈ Θ over θ ∈ Θ if b > 0 or supporting θ ∈ Θ
0
over θ ∈ Θ if b < 0.

factor and with a slight change of wording, the number of achieved bans

Example 6.

Let

Θ = {1, . . . , 101}

correspond to 101 urns, each containing

black balls and white balls. An urn is selected randomly, with known probability

p (i) = 1/101

of selecting the

ith

urn. A ball is then randomly drawn with an

equal probability of drawing any ball from the selected urn

θ,

as in Kyburg and
10−0.8 ,

Teng (2001, p. 216). The proportion of black balls in the rst urn is

11

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

and the proportion of black balls in each other urn is
hypothesis that

θ=1

and the composite hypothesis

10−2 . Consider
that θ ∈ {1, 2}.

the simple
The latter

is not the complex hypothesis that the ball was drawn either from the rst urn
or the second urn but rather is the intrinsically simple hypothesis that the ball
was randomly selected either from the rst urn with 50% probability or from the
second urn with 50% probability. Thus, equation (2.8) pertains, and if a black
ball is drawn, then

W ({1} , {1, 2} ; black) = W ({φ1 } , {φ1,2 } ; black)
f (black; φ1 )
f (black; φ1,2 )
f (black; 1)
=
(50%) f (black; 1) + (50%) f (black; 2)


10−0.8
≈ 2 ∈ 0, 101/2
=
−0.8
−2
(10
+ 10 ) /2

=

φ = φ1 and φ = φ1,2 are the two hypotheses in the new parameterization
in the notation of Section 2.1.2. In words, drawing a black ball weakly supports
where

the hypothesis that the ball was drawn from the rst urn over the hypothesis that
the ball was randomly selected either from the rst urn with 50% probability or
from the second urn with 50% probability. Again applying Denition 5 gives

W ({1} , {2, . . . , 100} ; black) =

10−0.8
= 101.2 ≥ 101 ,
10−2

showing that drawing a black ball strongly supports the hypothesis that the ball
was randomly selected from the rst urn over the hypothesis that was selected
randomly from one of the other urns.
Popper (2002, p. 430) anticipated a special case of Denition 5 by noting
that the explanatory power can be interpreted as a measure of the weight of
the evidence in favor of  the hypothesis. From that perspective, the weight of
evidence for one hypothesis over another may be deemed synonymous with the
explanatory power of the former hypothesis relative to the latter hypothesis,
thereby obviating normalization by

f (x).

However, the simple identication

of the weight of evidence with relative explanatory power breaks down in the
presence of a nuisance parameter (2.5.2).
The evidential functions on

dence functions on

2Θ × 2Θ × Ω should not be confused with the

Θ × Θ × Ω that Lele (2004) studied.

evi-

Denition 5 may extend

the latter to composite hypotheses by substituting each evidence function for
the likelihood ratio in equation (2.5) and by making the analogous modication
to the likelihood axiom of equation (4).

2.2.3 General law of likelihood
Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 lead to two practical equations for weighing evidence
favoring one hypotheses over another:

12
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Proposition 7.

General law of likelihood . For any explanatory function

W

denote the evidential function with respect to
0
00
in X = x that supports θ ∈ Θ over θ ∈ Θ is

W (Θ0 , Θ00 ; x) =
for all

Θ0 ⊆ Θ

and

Θ00 ⊆ Θ

such that

ex.

supθ0 ∈Θ0 L (θ0 ; x)
supθ00 ∈Θ00 L (θ00 ; x)

θ ∈ Θ0

and

ex,

let

Then the weight of evidence

θ ∈ Θ00

(2.9)

is each either a simple

hypothesis or a complex hypothesis but is

R
0
0
0
0 L (θ ; x) dp (θ |θ ∈ Θ )
R
W (Θ , Θ ; x) = Θ
L (θ00 ; x) dp (θ00 |θ ∈ Θ00 )
Θ00
0

for all

00

Θ0 ⊆ Θ and Θ00 ⊆ Θ such that θ ∈ Θ0

Proof. In the case that

0

θ ∈Θ

and

θ ∈Θ

and

00

θ ∈ Θ00

(2.10)

are intrinsically simple.

are intrinsically simple, equations

(2.8), (2.1), and (2.5) together entail equation (2.10).
proof derives equation (2.9) for the case that

θ ∈ Θ0

The remainder of the

and

θ ∈ Θ00

is each either

a simple hypothesis or a complex hypothesis. By equation (2.3),

θ0 = arg sup ex ({θ}) =⇒ ex (Θ0 ) = ex ({θ0 })
θ∈Θ0
for all

Θ0 ⊆ Θ.

Then, according to Denition 4 and equation (2.7),

θ0 = arg sup L (θ) =⇒ W (Θ0 , {θ0 }) = W ({θ0 } , Θ0 ) ,
θ∈Θ0
which, by equation (2.6), in turn yields

θ0 = arg sup L (θ) =⇒ W (Θ0 , Θ00 ) = W ({θ0 } , Θ00 )
θ∈Θ0
and, similarly,

θ00 = arg sup L (θ) =⇒ W (Θ0 , Θ00 ) = W (Θ0 , {θ00 })
θ∈Θ00
for all

Θ0 , Θ00 ⊆ Θ.

Combining results,


 

W (Θ , Θ ) = W
arg sup L (θ) , arg sup L (θ)
0

00

θ∈Θ0

θ∈Θ00

and thus, from equation (2.5),

W (Θ0 , Θ00 ) =

L (arg supθ∈Θ0 L (θ))
.
L (arg supθ∈Θ00 L (θ))

The proof does not depend on the exact form of the explanatory power of
a simple hypothesis but only requires that it monotonically increase with the
likelihood (Denition 4). See Foster (2004) for a defense of that requirement.
The connection to the principle of inference to the best explanation largely
answers the objection that an explanatory rationale for equation (2.9) has no
strong logical grounding (Lehmann, 2006).

13
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2.3 Implications of the theory
2.3.1 Properties of the weight of evidence
The coherence of the weight of evidence follows trivially from Proposition 7.

Proposition 8.

Coherence. For any explanatory function

evidential function with respect to
θ ∈ Θ0 and θ ∈ Θ00 ,

ex.

ex,

let

W

denote the

Given any simple or complex hypotheses

∀Θ00 ,Θ000 ⊆Θ ∀Θ0 ⊆Θ00 W (Θ0 , Θ000 ; x) ≤ W (Θ00 , Θ000 ; x) .

(2.11)

The coherence property prevents attributing more evidence to a simple or
complex hypothesis than to an implication of that hypothesis (Schervish, 1996;
Lavine and Schervish, 1999), as noted in Section 1.1. It now becomes clear that
the Bayes factor fails to qualify as a coherent measure of evidence:

Proposition 9.

Let

WBF (Θ0 , Θ00 ; x)

be the Bayes factor

R
0
0
0
0 f (x; θ ) dπ (θ )
,
WBF (Θ , Θ ; x) = R Θ
f (x; θ00 ) dπ 00 (θ00 )
Θ00
0

where

π0

and

π 00

00

are the prior distributions of

Equation (2.11) would not hold if

θ

on

Θ0

Proof. If there is a unique maximum likelihood value,
support outside

θ = θb,

Θ00 ,

respectively.

θb,

and if

π 00

on

Θ

has

then

n o

WBF θb , Θ; x = R
Θ

Therefore,

and

W = WBF .



bx
L θ;
L (θ00 ; x) dπ 00 (θ00 )

> 1.
n o

n o
∀Θ000 ⊆Θ WBF θb , Θ000 ; x > WBF (Θ, Θ000 ; x) even though θb ⊂ Θ,

against Proposition 8.
While a ratio of posterior probabilities satises coherence (1.1), it generally
violates the principle of inference to the best explanation.

Example 10.

Let

Θ =

 (1)
θ , . . . , θ(101)

correspond to 101 distinct cosmo-

logical theories, each providing a dierent physical explanation of astronomical
observations represented by x. The outcome X =

−0.8
(1)
bility 10
on the big bang theory θ = θ
and
100 theories, including the steady state theory

x would occur with proba10−2 on each of the other

θ = θ(2) . If the theories were

judged equally plausible before the measurements were made, each would have
equal prior probability. Then the Bayes factor would incoherently ascribe more
evidential weight to the big bang than to the hypothesis that either the big bang
or the steady state theory is true:

WBF

n
o n
o 
θ(1) , θ(1) , θ(2) ; x =

10−0.8
≈ 2.
(10−0.8 + 10−2 ) /2

14
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The ratio of posterior probabilities is coherent:


π θ = θ(1) |x
10−0.8

 = −0.8
≤ 1.
10
+ 10−2
π θ ∈ θ(1) , θ(2) |x
However, the posterior odds fails to ascribe more weight to the big bang than to
its denial, revealing a conict between the principle of insucient reason and
the principle of inference to the best explanation:


π θ = θ(1) |x
10−0.8
=
= 10−0.8 < 1.
(100) (10−2 )
π θ=
6 θ(1) |x
Few scientists would let a plethora of less adequate explanations prevent them
from making an inference to the best explanation, the merits of Bayesianism
in other settings notwithstanding.

By contrast, the general law of likelihood

indicates that there is strong evidence that the big bang occurred:

W

n

o n
o  10−0.8
θ(1) , θ(2) , . . . , θ(101) ; x =
= 101.2 .
10−2

The Bayesian approach treats the theories of Example 10 exactly as if they
were the randomly selected urns of Example 6, as seen in the mathematical
equality of the results. Bayesianism has long been criticized for its inability to
distinguish between frequencies of parameter values and levels of belief about
parameter values (e.g., Kardaun et al., 2003). While no prior distribution can
encode a lack of information (Kass and Wasserman, 1996; Bernardo, 1997), a
constant likelihood function does do so (Edwards, 1992, 4.5).
In order to establish two more properties of the weight of evidence, the
probability of observing misleading evidence mentioned in Section 1.1 is now
dened more generally.

Denition 11.

Θ0 ⊆ Θ, Θ00 ⊆ Θ, and Λ > 1, the probability
0
00
observing misleading evidence in X = x that supports θ ∈ Θ over θ ∈ Θ
00
level Λ with respect to some θ in Θ is
For any

of

at

αθ (Λ; Θ0 , Θ00 ) = Pθ (W (Θ0 , Θ00 ; X) ≥ Λ) ,
where

X

has probability density or mass function

f (•; θ).

As argued in Section 1.1, the weight of evidence is dicult to interpret unless the probability of observing misleading approaches 0 asymptotically. That
interpretability condition is satised in the case that one of two mutually exclusive hypotheses is a composite hypothesis corresponding to a parameter interval.
The proof is facilitated by rst noting that the weight of evidence almost always
asymptotically selects the correct hypothesis:

Proposition 12.
contains

Consistency. For any

Θ00 ⊂ Θ

such that its interior

int Θ00

θ,
15
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lim Pθ (W (Θ\Θ00 , Θ00 ) < 1) = lim Pθ (W (Θ00 , Θ\Θ00 ) > 1) = 1

n→∞

(2.12)

n→∞

under regularity conditions ensuring the weak consistency of
likelihood estimate of

θb(n) ,

the maximum

θ.
θb(n)

Proof. The weak consistency of

implies



limn→∞ Pθ θb(n) ∈ int Θ00 = 1.

Equation (2.12) then follows from Proposition 7.

Proposition 13.
contains

Interpretability . For any

Θ00 ⊂ Θ such that its interior int Θ00

θ,
lim αθ (Λ; Θ\Θ00 , Θ00 ) = 0

n→∞

for all

Λ>1

under regularity conditions ensuring the weak consistency of the

maximum likelihood estimate of

θ.

Proof. By Proposition 12,

Λ > 1 =⇒ lim Pθ (W (Θ\Θ00 , Θ00 ) ≥ Λ) = 0.
n→∞

2.3.2 Likelihood sets
The concept of the likelihood set is closely related to that of the strength of
evidence for composite hypotheses, as sketched in Section 1.2.

Denition 14.
Λ

for

Given some xed
0
with respect to Θ is

X=x



0

E (Λ) = E (Λ; x, Θ ) =

Λ>1

and

Θ0 ⊆ Θ,

the likelihood set of level


θ : θ ∈ Θ, L (θ ; x) ≥ sup L (θ ; x) /Λ .
00

00

00

0

θ 0 ∈Θ0

Denition 15.
Θ

0

is

E 10

β

Given some xed

, its likelihood set of

Remark 16.

β ∈ R1 and Θ0 ⊆ Θ,
β
level 10 .

the

β -ban

likelihood set

β -bit likelihood set and the β -nat evidence set could
Λ = 2β and Λ = eβ , respectively. MacKay (2002)

Likewise, the

be dened by substituting

discusses the history of calling logarithmic units bits, bans, or nats, according
to the base of the logarithm.
The likelihood set is used to distinguish parameter values supported by the
data from parameter values less consistent with the data (Fisher, 1973; Barnard,
1967; Hoch and Blume, 2008). Such usage implicitly invokes a method of measuring the strength of evidence of a composite hypothesis in the same way as
rejecting the hypothesis of a parameter value falling outside a

1−α

condence

interval implicitly invokes a hypothesis test with a Type I error rate of

α.

This

practice is more precisely understood in terms of the weight of evidence for a
composite hypothesis over its negation:

16
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Proposition 17.
to

Θ0 ,

If

E (Λ)

is the likelihood set of level

Λ

for

X=x

with respect

then

W (E (Λ) , Θ0 \E (Λ) ; x) > Λ.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Proposition 7 and Denition 14.
In short, the practice of considering a parameter value insuciently supported by the data if it falls outside a likelihood set receives some justication
from measuring the strength of evidence for a composite hypothesis by its bestsupported parameter value. However, since that practice is equivalent to weighing evidence for a simple hypothesis against that of a composite hypothesis in
which it is essentially nested, it lacks interpretability in the sense of Sections 1.1
and 2.3.1. Non-interpretable procedures can be unsuitable for sequential data
analysis (2.4.4).

2.3.3 Bioequivalence illustration
Suppose

θ

is some scalar dierence between two treatments that are considered

bioequivalent if

θ− < θ < θ +

for two values

θ−

and

θ+ ,

which are often set by

a regulatory agency. The bioequivalence testing problem is naturally framed as

θ ∈ (θ− , θ+ ) over θ 6∈ (θ− , θ+ ).
θ ∈ (θ− , θ+ ) is accepted if an
interval of a sucient level of condence is a subset of (θ− , θ+ ). Choi et al. (2008)

that of measuring the strength of evidence for

In a Neyman-Pearson approach to bioequivalence,

similarly consider there to be strong evidence of bioequivalence if a likelihood

E (Λ)

interval

of suciently high level

Λ

is a subset of

(θ− , θ+ ).

The latter approach is justied by the following implication of the explanatory theory of evidence (2.2). In order to accommodate multidimensional parameters, the implication is stated in terms of equivalence intervals and likelihood intervals rather than equivalence sets and likelihood sets. Quantifying the
strength of evidence for equivalence,

0

Θ ⊆Θ
0
subset of Θ :
some

θ 6∈ Θ
Θ0 .

exceeds

Proof. From

over nonequivalence,

θ 6∈ Θ0 ,

for

corresponds to nding the likelihood set of highest level that is a

Proposition 18.
0

θ ∈ Θ0 ,

Λ

The weight of evidence in

if and only if

E (Λ) ⊆ Θ0 ,

E (Λ),

X =x

that supports

the likelihood set of level

Λ,

θ ∈ Θ0

over

is a subset of

the denition of a likelihood set gives

∀θ00 6∈Θ0 ∃θ0 ∈Θ0 L (θ00 ; x) Λ < L (θ0 ; x) ,
inf θ00 6∈Θ0 L (θ0 ; x) /L (θ00 ; x) > Λ, the left-hand side of
0
which equals W (Θ , Θ\Θ ; x) by Proposition 7, proving suciency. To prove
00
0
necessity, assume there is a value θ
that is in E (Λ) but not in Θ . Given
0
0
0
00
W (Θ , Θ\Θ ; x) > Λ, Proposition 7 yields supθ0 ∈Θ0 L (θ ; x) > ΛL (θ ; x) since
θ00 ∈ Θ\Θ0 . Because θ00 ∈ E (Λ) , we have supθ0 ∈Θ L (θ0 ; x) ≤ ΛL (θ00 ; x), pro-

requiring that sup θ 0 ∈Θ0

0

ducing a contradiction.
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2.4 Multiplicity
2.4.1 Simultaneous inference
In a typical problem commonly encountered in high-dimensional biology, there

θ1 , . . . , θD with the corresponding hypotheses
θ1 ∈ Θ01 , . . . , θD ∈ Θ0D such that θ = hθ1 , . . . , θD i and Θ01 ×· · ·×Θ0D ⊂ Θ1 ×· · ·×
ΘD = Θ. A necessary and sucient condition for multiple hypotheses to hold

are multiple focus subparameters

simultaneously is that the parameter of interest is in the intersection of their

θ1 ∈ Θ01 and θ2
0
Θ1 ×Θ2 , if and only if hθ1 , θ2 i ∈ (Θ01

representative sets. For example,
and

hθ1 , θ2 i ∈

∈ Θ02 , i.e., hθ1 , θ2 i ∈ Θ01 × Θ2
× Θ2 )∩(Θ1 × Θ02 ) = Θ01 ×Θ02 .

In the same way, whether one or more of multiple hypotheses holds is equivalent
to whether the parameter of interest is in the union of their representative
sets.

The simultaneous inference problem is thereby reduced to a composite

hypothesis problem to which the laws of likelihood apply without modication.
According to the models most widely used in bioinformatics, each focus
subparameter generates data independent of the data of the other focus subparameters:

f (x; θ, γ) =

D
Y

fi (xi ; θi , γ) ,

(2.13)

i=1

hx1 , . . . , xD i = x and fi (•; θi ) is the probability density or mass function
i ∈ {1, . . . , D}. The likelihood function on Θi is Li = Li (•; xi ). Then
0
00
weight of evidence for θi ∈ Θi over θi ∈ Θi is simply

where
of

Xi

the

for

Wi (Θ0i , Θ00i ) = W (Θ1 × · · · × Θ0i × · · · × ΘD , Θ1 × · · · × Θ00i × · · · × ΘD )
=

supθi0 ∈Θ0i Li (θi0 ; xi )
supθi00 ∈Θ00i Li (θi00 ; xi )

according to equation (2.9). Likewise, the weight of evidence for

θ2 ∈

Θ02 over

θ1 ∈

Θ01 alone is

W (Θ01 × Θ02 × Θ3 × · · · × ΘD , Θ01 × Θ2 × · · · × ΘD ) =
and so on. The weight of evidence for

θ2 ∈
/ Θ02 is at least as large as that for
θ2 ∈
/ Θ02 , that is, with Θ01 = Θ\Θ01 ,
supθ10 ∈Θ01 L1 (θ10 ) supθ20 ∈Θ02 L2 (θ20 )
00
supθ100 ∈Θ
/ 01 L1 (θ1 )

Example 19.

00
supθ200 ∈Θ
/ 02 L2 (θ2 )

Supposing

D

≥

and

supθ20 ∈Θ02 L2 (θ20 ; x)
supθ2 ∈Θ2 L2 (θ2 ; x)

,

θ1 ∈ Θ01 and θ2 ∈ Θ02 over θ1 ∈
/ Θ01 and
0
0
θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2 over θ1 ∈
/ Θ01 or
supθ10 ∈Θ01 L1 (θ10 ) supθ20 ∈Θ02 L2 (θ20 )

suphθ00 ,θ00 i∈(Θ0 ×Θ)∪(Θ×Θ0 ) L1 (θ100 ) L2 (θ200 )
1
2
1
2
.

.

θi = 0
θi = 1 if guilty

murder trials take place on a certain day, let

if the ith defendant is neither guilty of manslaughter nor murder,
of manslaughter, and

θ1 ∈ Θ01

θi = 0

if guilty of murder. Since the evidence presented
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in each trial does not depend on that of other trials, the weight of evidence that
defendant

i

is guilty of murder is

Wi ({2} , {0, 1}) =

Li (2; xi )
.
Li (0; xi ) ∨ Li (1; xi )

The independence condition is not always as appropriate as in the example:
it would produce erroneous results in Example 24.

2.4.2 Multiple-comparison adjustments
It is often maintained that multiple comparisons such as those made in the analysis of microarray data call for adjustments to reported levels of evidence that
would be obtained for single comparisons. Such adjustments are almost invariably justied by a desire to control a false discovery rate or other generalized
Type I error rate. For example, Korn and Freidlin (2006) regard the repeated
application of the law of likelihood as highly dangerous since it treats the number
of comparisons performed as evidentially irrelevant. Indeed, because the special
law of likelihood quanties the strength of evidence associated with each comparison rather than controlling a rate of false positives, the strength of evidence
for one hypothesis over another remains the same irrespective of the number
of comparisons made (Blume, 2002). More generally, while the approach based
on the laws of likelihood accounts for data dependence between comparisons
(2.4.1), it is not modied to control error rates. In fact, the rationale for such
control applies even under the independence of the data associated with each
comparison.

Example 20.

Since Korn and Freidlin (2006) liken the problem of multiple

comparisons to that of selective reporting, consider a drug company that replicates

N

independent microarray experiments each yielding

n

measured ratios of

D genes under
j th experiment, the company calculates
(j)
(j)
the weight of evidence in expression ratios Xi
= xi for θi ∈ Θ0 , the hypothe00
sis that the ith gene is dierentially expressed, over θi ∈ Θ , the hypothesis that
expression between paired treatment and control mice for each of

essentially the same conditions. For the

it is equivalently expressed between treatment and control. However, the company only reports to the regulatory agency which genes have decisive evidence of
dierential expression within each experiment along with the details of the statistical model and selection process. For any given gene, the process of selection
clearly has no impact on the probability of observing misleading evidence. Let
(j)
yi = 1 if the ith gene has decisive evidence of dierential expression in the j th
(j)
experiment and yi
= 0 otherwise. The cumulative weight of evidence in the
censored or reduced data for the

ith

gene under the simplifying assumption of
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independence (2.13) is

wi (Θ0i , Θ00i ) =

=


 


(j)
(j)
Pθi0 1[100,∞) W Θ0 , Θ00 ; Xi
= yi

 


QN
(j)
(j)
= yi
supθi00 ∈Θ00 j=1 Pθi00 1[100,∞) W Θ0 , Θ00 ; Xi
supθi0 ∈Θ0

QN

j=1

supθi0 ∈Θ0 (αθ0 (100; Θ0 , Θ00 ))

N −N1

N1

(1 − αθ0 (100; Θ0 , Θ00 ))

N1

(1 − αθ00 (100; Θ0 , Θ00 ))

supθi00 ∈Θ00 (αθ00 (100; Θ0 , Θ00 ))

N −N1

,

(j)
is the number of experiments for which yi = 1, in the terminology of
0
00
Denition 11. As N → ∞, N1 → N if θi ∈ Θ or N1 → 0 if θi ∈ Θ , with the
0
00
implication that 1(1,∞) (wi (Θi , Θi )) is a weakly consistent estimator of 1Θ0 (θ)

where

N1

1Θ0 (θ), the
loss in eciency due to the selection-induced data reduction is not addressed by

by a variant of Proposition 12. From this perspective of estimating
the control of an error rate.

The evidential interpretation of p -value adjusted for multiple comparisons
has its roots in Fisher's disjunction: if the p -value is low, then either an event
of low probability has occurred or the null hypothesis is false (Fisher, 1925;
Johnstone, 1986; Barnard, 1967). Without some adjustment, a low p -value can
instead occur with high probability given enough tests. Thus, even when the

p -value is understood as a measure of evidence, the multiple testing problem
is formulated in terms of error rate control. If a single hypothesis is tested at
a given signicance level

α,

then

α

is the probability of making a Type I er-

ror under the null hypothesis. However, if multiple hypotheses are each tested
at level

α,

then the probability of at least one Type I error under the truth

of all null hypotheses is greater than
dependence between test statistics.

α

except in the trivial case of complete

This probability is called the family-wise

error rate (FWER). Consequently, a plethora of methods have been developed
to control the FWER for various assumptions while retaining as much power
to reject the null hypothesis as possible. The control of FWERs has been criticized for admitting many false negatives in order to avoid all false positives in
most samples, and newer criteria for judging signicance gain power by allowing
more false positives. Such criteria include control of the probability that false
positives exceed a given number or proportion (Van der Laan et al., 2004). A
less conservative multiple comparison procedure controls the false discovery rate
(FDR), the expectation value of the ratio of the number of Type I errors to the
number of rejected null hypotheses (Benjamini and Hochberg, 2000; Benjamini
et al., 2001; Benjamini and Yekutieli, 2005; Yekutieli et al., 2006; Benjamini and
Liu, 1999). The smallest FDR at which a hypothesis is rejected (Storey, 2002)
is oered in many microarray data analysis programs as a corrected or adjusted

p -value; e.g., Pollard et al. (2005). All of these approaches replace control of
the test-wise error rate with control of a dierent Type I error rate, and all may
lead to a corrected p -value for each null hypothesis considered (Van der Laan
et al., 2004).
Considering the p -value as a measure of statistical evidence that must be
adjusted to continue to measure statistical evidence under multiple comparisons
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has been formally justied as follows. In signicance testing, the observed p value is viewed as the probability that a true null hypothesis would be rejected
under repeated sampling in the hypothetical case that the observed test statistic
happened to lie on the boundary of the rejection region (Cox, 1977). Here, the
rejection region is purely hypothetical since no decision to reject or not reject
the null hypothesis is made on the basis of any error rate actually selected
before observation, as the Neyman-Pearson framework would require.

That

signicance testing interpretation of the p -value lies behind dening the adjusted

p -value of a null hypothesis as the lowest Type I error rate of a test at which the
null hypothesis would be rejected (Shaer, 1995). This overall Type I error rate
is usually a family-wise error rate, a generalization thereof, or a false discovery
rate (Van der Laan et al., 2004). This formalism of dening a corrected p -value
in terms of controlling an error rate is combined with the motivation behind
reporting a corrected p -value rather than a decision on the rejection of the
hypothesis, namely, the corrected p -value quanties the strength of evidence
against the null hypothesis (Wright, 1992). Evidentially interpreting a p -value
corrected in order to control a hypothetical Type I error rate exemplies what
Goodman (1998) and Johnstone (1986) noted of signicance testing in general:
Neymanian theory fuels Fisherian practice.
The argument that p -values must be corrected to control a Type I error
rate would obtain even in the absence of information about the distribution of
interest in data from other distributions. This raises the question of whether
an adjusted p -value or an unadjusted quantity such as a raw p -value or likelihood ratio better measures the weight of evidence with respect to one of several
comparisons. Example 19 may clarify the issue. In weighing the evidence for
and against the hypothesis that a defendant is guilty, should the jury take into
account the number of defendants currently under trial for the same crime elsewhere in the country, perhaps to control a rate of false convictions, or is that
information irrelevant to task of assessing the strength of evidence for guilt over
innocence in the trial at hand? As Mayo and Cox (2006) argued, while controlling family-wise error rates may prove advantageous in certain contexts in which
the goal of data analysis is to determine a course of action, the uncorrected p value is more appropriate in contexts where inductive reasoning or evidence
evaluation is the aim.

Such clarication of the purpose behind data analysis

is crucial, for confusing the weight of statistical evidence with how that evidence should be used can have undesired consequences. Since Fisher (1973, pp.
95-96, 103-106) , a primary argument for measuring evidential strength rather
than computing optimal decisions has relied on the unpredictability of the use
to which evidence will be put.

While the nuisance parameter problem may

often make complete separation between evidence and application impossible
even when guided by the explanatory theory of evidence (2.5), such distinction
remains an ideal worth approaching, at least in basic science.
A non-decision-theoretic context suggesting adjustment of p -values is that in
which it is believed that "most of the individual null hypotheses are essentially
correct" (Cox, 2006, p.88), thereby to some extent combining the strength of
evidence in the data with that of one's prior condence. The same purpose is
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served more precisely and frankly by assigning prior probability to each of the
null hypotheses in proportion to such condence (Westfall et al., 1997).
The observation that correcting p -values for selection has decision-theoretic
rather than inferential or evidential rationales does not mean an evidential rationale for such correction will never be formulated. That would be accomplished
either by arguing without appeal to the control of error rates, to optimality, or
to other decision-theoretic concepts or by demonstrating that the problem of
evidence cannot be separated from the problem of decision. For related discussions on the distinction between the decision problem and the inference problem,
see Fisher (1973), Edwards (1992, Appendix I), Hald (2007), Montazeri et al.
(2010), and Bickel (2010).
Evidential inference based directly on the law of likelihood is only beginning
to nd applications in extreme multiple comparison situations. Taking a rst
step, Strug and Hodge (2006) studied the implications of evidential inference as
an alternative to Neyman-Pearson error rate control in linkage analysis. They
nd that although consideration of error rates informs study design, their use
in correcting p -values distorts the strength of evidence.

2.4.3 Empirical Bayes
The error-control rationale for adjusting p -values is distinct from the rationale
behind empirical Bayes methods formulated in order to "borrow strength" or
available information from distributions besides the distribution corresponding
to the comparison at hand. The latter rationale motivates some applications to
genomic expression data since it is believed that measurements of the expression
of some genes are informative for inference about the expression of other genes.
It is also consistent with the uncontested applicability of Bayes's theorem in the
presence of a distribution of parameter frequencies (Fisher, 1973; Wilkinson,
1977; Edwards, 1992; Kyburg and Teng, 2006; Hald, 2007, p. 36; Fraser, 2009),
a situation in which few would insist on corrections to control the FWER or
FDR when the problem is one of inference rather than decision.
Typical empirical Bayes methods rely on modeling parameter values as random variables of a distribution

π not intended to reect actual frequencies under

repeated sampling. While that approach often leads to competitive performance
(Yanofsky and Bickel, 2010; Montazeri et al., 2010) or even optimality under
some class of loss functions, its relevance to objectively weighing evidence has
received little attention. Section 5.2 explores the use of a successful empirical
Bayes method for inference under the special law of likelihood in the context of
microarray data analysis.

2.4.4 Sequential data analysis
The consideration of stopping times in settings involving sequential analysis, like
the that of error rates in settings involving multiple comparisons, is relevant to
study design (Berger and Wolpert, 1988) but not to measuring the strength
of evidence under the likelihood principle (Blume, 2008).

An unscrupulous
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θ ∈ Θ0 by supplementing a sample of
n− independent and identically distributed (IID) observations x1 , . . . , xn− with
0
00
additional IID observations xn− +1 , . . . , xn just until W (Θ , Θ ) ≥ Λ, called the
0
00
0
00
stopping condition , where Θ ∩ Θ = ∅, Θ ∪ Θ = Θ, and Λ is the desired level
of evidence (Λ > 1).
(n)
Let X
= hX1 , . . . , Xn i denote the n-tuple of IID random variables of which
x1 , . . . , xn are realizations, and assume that θ = Eθ (X1 ) for some θ ∈ Θ00 and
2
that σ = varθ (X1 ) is known and nite. The probability that the investigator

investigator may attempt to conclude that

can ever successfully support the false hypothesis depends on the construction

Θ00 .
00
00
If θ = θ is the hypothesis the investigator endeavors to reject, then Θ =
00
{θ }. For any nite n− and Λ, the number of additional observations needed

of

to satisfy the stopping condition will almost surely be nite according to the
law of the iterated logarithm (Robbins, 1970). In other words, the probability
of eventually observing misleading evidence is 1. By implication, as more data
are obtained indenitely, a level- Λ likelihood interval that does not contain

θ

will almost always occur. An anonymous reviewer pointed out this objection to
likelihood sets as dened in Section 2.3.2.
The ability of the investigator to sample until achieving the desired conclusion regardless of the initial study size
interpretability of

W R1 \ {θ00 } , {θ00 }



n−

is a consequence of the non-

that was noted in Sections 1.1 and 2.3.1.

It will now be seen that the use of an interpretable weight of evidence solves the
problem.

Proposition 21.

int Θ00 contains θ,
α ∈ (0, 1], and any Λ > 1, there exists a counting number n− such that




Pθ ∃n ∈ {n− + 1, n− + 2, . . . } : W Θ\Θ00 , Θ00 ; X (n) ≥ Λ ≤ α
For any

Θ00 ⊂ Θ

such that its interior

any



b(n) = θb X (n) ,
under regularity conditions ensuring the strong consistency of θ
(n)
the maximum likelihood estimate of θ , where X
is a random n-tuple on a
(Ω, Σ, Pθ ).

limn→∞ θb(n) ∈ int Θ00 = 1

basic probability space
Proof.

Pθ



by the strong consistency of

θb(n) ,

imply-

ing



lim Pθ ∀n ∈ {n− + 1, n− + 2, . . . } : θb(n) ∈ Θ00 = 1;

n− →∞





lim Pθ ∃n ∈ {n− + 1, n− + 2, . . . } : W Θ\Θ00 , Θ00 ; X (n) > 1 = 0.

n− →∞

If the data are censored, e.g., by the drug company of Example 20, just until
satisfying the stopping condition, then the eective sampling model is such that

X (N ) , N = x(n) , n , where the reported sample
the random quantity N . In that case, the likelihood

n

the observation is

size

a realization of

function

is
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for the purposes of weighing evidence or, alternatively, for performing Bayesian
inference, is specied by

 D
E


L θ; x(n) , n = f x(n) ; θ Pθ (N = n)


L θ; x(n) = f X (n) = x(n) ; θ , as in the absence of cen
(N )
soring. To see that in the discrete-data case, note that Pθ X
= x(n) , N = n =

Pθ X (N ) = x(n) |N = n Pθ (N = n). The factor Pθ (N = n) automatically ac-

rather than simply by

counts for the stopping rule without any ad hoc adjustments.

2.5 Nuisance parameters
2.5.1 Elimination of nuisance parameters
Suppose the family of distributions is parameterized by a free nuisance param-

γ ∈ Γ ⊆ R1ν as
that neither θ nor γ
eter

well as by the free interest parameter
is a function of the other parameter;

xed positive integers.

θ ∈ Θ ⊆ R1D such
both ν and D are

The likelihood function corresponding to each proba-

bility density or mass function

f (•; θ, γ)

on

Ω

is

` (•) = ` (•; x) = f (x; •)

on

Θ × Γ.
The problem of measuring the weight of evidence in the presence of a nuisance parameter has been posed as a problem of approximating the weight of
evidence that would be in the data were the value of the nuisance parameter
known (Tsou and Royall, 1995). The nuisance parameter is often eliminated by
replacing the unknown likelihood function

lihood function

L

on

Θ

` on Θ×Γ with a known reduced

like-

such as an integrated likelihood function, a conditional

likelihood function, a marginal likelihood function, an estimated likelihood function, or a prole likelihood function.
Applying that approach to composite hypotheses, a reduced likelihood func-

Wγ (Θ0 , Θ00 ) = supθ0 ∈Θ0 ` (θ0 , γ) / supθ00 ∈Θ00 ` (θ00 , γ),
θ ∈ Θ0 over θ ∈ Θ00 , since Wγ (Θ0 , Θ00 ) is unknown

tion is chosen to approximate
the weight of evidence for
without knowledge of

γ.

Some of the reduced likelihood functions provide bet-

ter approximations than others, depending on the sampling model, as will be
seen in Section 2.5.2. Once the nuisance parameters have been eliminated, the

L on Θ takes the place of the likelihood function,
supθ0 ∈Θ0 L (θ0 ) / supθ00 ∈Θ00 L (θ00 ) to approximate Wγ (Θ0 , Θ00 ).

reduced likelihood function
yielding

The elimination of nuisance parameters is exemplied here with the pro-

Lprofile , dened by ∀θ∈Θ Lprofile (θ) = Lprofile (θ; x) =
supγ∈Γ ` (θ, γ; x). Under the special law of likelihood, the prole likelihood ratio
Lprofile (θ0 ; x) /Lprofile (θ00 ; x) serves as a widely applicable approximation to the
0
00
weight of evidence in X = x for θ = θ over model θ = θ . Likewise, the strength
0
00
of evidence in X = x that supports θ ∈ Θ over θ ∈ Θ may be approximated
le likelihood function

by

Wprofile (Θ0 , Θ00 ) = Wprofile (Θ0 , Θ00 ; x) =

supθ0 ∈Θ0 Lprofile (θ0 ; x)
.
supθ00 ∈Θ00 Lprofile (θ00 ; x)

(2.14)

24

http://biostats.bepress.com/cobra/art71

provided that each hypothesis is either simple or complex.

Example 22.

The normal family. The proposed methodology will be illustrated

with the comparison of the hypotheses |θ| > θ+ and |θ| ≤ θ+ for some θ+ ≥ 0 on

(1)
(n)
the basis of x = x , ..., x
, a sample of n independent observations from a
1
2
normal distribution with unknown mean θ ∈ R and variance γ = σ ∈ (0, ∞).
Hence, the density function satises

f x; θ, σ


2

n
Y

1
1
√
exp −
=
2
2πσ
j=1



x(j) − θ
σ

2 !
.

(2.15)

Since, as noted in Section 1.2,

Lprofile (θ0 ) /Lprofile (θ00 ) = (b
σ (θ0 ) /b
σ (θ00 ))
the strength of evidence for

Wprofile

where

θb

|θ| > θ+

over

|θ| ≤ θ+

−n

,

is


−n
inf θ00 ∈{−θ+ ,θ+ } σb(θσb00 )

 0 −n
R1 \ [−θ+ , θ+ ] , [−θ+ , θ+ ] =
σ
b(θ )
supθ0 ∈{−θ+ ,θ+ }
σ
b
and

 
σ
b =σ
b θb

are the maximum likelihood estimates of

θb > θ+
,
θb ≤ θ+
θ

and

σ.

In

bioequivalence applications (2.3.3),



Wprofile (−θ+ , θ+ ) , R1 \ (−θ+ , θ+ ) = 1/Wprofile R1 \ (−θ+ , θ+ ) , (−θ+ , θ+ )
approximates the evidence for equivalence.
The prole likelihood has several advantages as an approximation: it resembles a likelihood ratio under certain conditions and has a low asymptotic probability of misleading evidence (Royall, 2000a), and, if the nuisance parameter is
orthogonal to the interest parameter, it is equal to the likelihood ratio (Royall,
1997). For some models, the nuisance parameter may instead be eliminated by
use of a marginal or conditional likelihood (Royall, 1997) as approximations of
the likelihood function without nuisance parameters.
Alternatively, provided a probability distribution or other measure of

γ

that

is suitable for evidential inference, the nuisance parameter could be eliminated
by integration. Methods have been proposed for specifying a nuisance parameter
distribution or other measure to integrate the likelihood not only for Bayesian
statistics (Kass and Raftery, 1995; Berger et al., 1999; Clyde and George, 2004)
but also for Neyman-Pearson statistics (Severini, 2007, 2010). In fact, the nuisance parameter measure need not be a pure prior distribution since it may
depend on data (Kalbeisch and Sprott, 1970; Aitkin, 1991; Dempster, 1997;
Severini, 2007, 2010).
This exibility of choice in the method for eliminating nuisance parameters allows researchers to tailor data analyses to particular applications such
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as that of Example 24, underscoring the fact that the motivating objectivity
condition of Section 1.1 by no means reduces statistical inference to a series of
automatic calculations. On the other hand, dierent approaches to eliminating
nuisance parameters can yield similar results.

For example, likelihoods inte-

grated with respect to certain distributions approximate the prole likelihood
(Severini, 2007).

2.5.2 Other interpretations of prole likelihood
Instead of seeing the prole likelihood as one of many possible approximations
of the unknown likelihood function of the interest parameter, the prole likelihood could be derived from Proposition 2.9 by framing the nuisance parameter
problem as an instance of the composite hypothesis problem as follows. Royall
(1992), He et al. (2007), and Zhang (2009b), contrary to Section 2.5.1, identied

hθ, γi ∈ Θ0 × Γ over hθ, γi ∈ Θ00 × Γ with the weight
00
of evidence for θ ∈ Θ over θ ∈ Θ , thus assuming that the latter can be precisely known without knowledge of γ . Under that conation of the problem of

the weight of evidence for

0

composite hypotheses with the problem of nuisance parameters, equation (2.14)
would exactly specify the weight of evidence for

θ ∈ Θ0

over

θ ∈ Θ00 ,

as it does

in the axiomatic system of Zhang (2009b).
However, there are sampling models in which the prole likelihood can fail
to meaningfully measure the weight of evidence (Royall, 2000a; He et al., 2007).
For that reason, Royall (1992) and He et al. (2007) represented the weight of
evidence as an interval of prole likelihood ratios, and the weight was represented as a single likelihood ratio in Sections 2.2 and 2.5.1 that is unknown if
there is an unknown nuisance parameter.

The elimination of a nuisance pa-

γ , whether by proling, integration, or other means, only approximates
Wγ (Θ0 , Θ00 ).
rameter

The prole likelihood ratio (2.14) would much more plausibly measure the

θ ∈ Θ0
0
for θ ∈ Θ

θ ∈ Θ00 than it would measure the
θ ∈ Θ00 , provided that each hypothesis is

explanatory power of

relative to

weight of evidence

over

either simple or complex, as seen in the following examples. More generally, the

ex (Θ0 , Θ00 ) of θ ∈ Θ0 compared to θ ∈ Θ00 to explain X = x, is
supγ 0 ∈Γ exγ 0 (Θ ) / supγ 00 ∈Γ exγ 00 (Θ00 ), where exγ 0 is an explanatory function for
0
0
00
0
0
00
0
00 00
each γ ∈ Γ such that exγ 0 ({θ } , {θ }) = ` (θ , γ ) /` (θ , γ ) for all θ , θ ∈ Θ
0
and γ ∈ Γ, assuming γ is xed. The weight of evidence nonetheless remains
Wγ (Θ0 , Θ00 ), a function of γ .
relative ability

0

Example 23.
mean

γ

For any single observation

and variance

θ,

x

of a normal variate

X

of unknown

the prole likelihood would ascribe innite weight of

evidence in that observation to the hypothesis that

θ=0

over any

θ 6= 0,

which

is clearly untenable (Royall, 2000a; He et al., 2007). However, the hypothesis
that

θ = 0,

if true, would explain the observation much better than would any

other simple hypothesis about

θ, resonating with interpreting the prole likelihood

ratio as a measure of relative explanatory power.
The Neyman-Scott problem also precludes viewing prole likelihood as evi-

26

http://biostats.bepress.com/cobra/art71

dence (Royall, 1992; He et al., 2007) but accords with viewing it as explanatory
power. Less pathological problems point to the same conclusion.

Example 24.

In a scenario posed by an anonymous reviewer, exactly

know a secret. The probability that the secret does
leak is

(
1
f (x; θ1 , . . . , θD ) =
0

if
if

(x = 1)

QD
x = 1 − i=1 (1 − θi )
QD
x = i=1 (1 − θi )

θi = 1 if the ith insider leaks the secret or θi = 0 otherwise.
(X = 1), the likelihood function is given by
(
QD
1 if i=1 (1 − θi ) = 0
L (θ1 , . . . , θD ; 1) =
QD
0 if i=1 (1 − θi ) = 1

where
leaks

D insiders
(x = 0)

or does not

If the secret

Thus, the leaking of a secret constitutes irrefutable evidence that at least one of
the insiders leaked it over the hypothesis

hθ1 , . . . , θD i = h0, . . . , 0i

that none of

them leaked it:


 1
D
W {0, 1} \ {h0, . . . , 0i} , {h0, . . . , 0i} = .
0
However, the evidence against any given suspect is much weaker. Quantifying

Wi ({1} , {0}), the weight of evidence that θi = 1 over θi = 0, treats θi as the
interest parameter and γ = hθ1 , . . . , θi−1 , θi+1 , . . . , θD i as the nuisance parameter. In this case, eliminating the latter by means of the prole likelihood (2.5)
yields

Wi ({1} , {0}) =

supγ∈{0,1}D−1 L (θ1 , . . . , θi−1 , 1, θi+1 , . . . , θD ; 1)
supγ∈{0,1}D−1 L (θ1 , . . . , θi−1 , 0, θi+1 , . . . , θD ; 1)

which is reasonable for suciently large

D.

For small

D,

= 1,

the integration method

Wi ({1} , {0})
This can be accomplished without recourse

of eliminating nuisance parameters is more reasonable since it allows
to be close to but greater than 1.

θi as an independent
p (θi ) ∈ (0, 1), entailing
ith insider does or does

to subjective or conventional priors by modeling each
Bernoulli random variable of limiting relative frequency
that

p (1)

or

p (0)

is the frequentist probability that the

not reveal the secret. Then the integration method gives

R
L (θ1 , . . . , θi−1 , 1, θi+1 , . . . , θD ; 1) dp (θ1 ) · · · dp (θi−1 ) dp (θi+1 ) · · · dp (θD )
R
Wi ({1} , {0}) =
L (θ1 , . . . , θi−1 , 0, θi+1 , . . . , θD ; 1) dp (θ1 ) · · · dp (θi−1 ) dp (θi+1 ) · · · dp (θD )
1
=
> 1,
D−1
1 − p (0)
approaching the result of the prole likelihood as

1/p (1)

for

D → ∞,

but

Wi ({1} , {0}) =

D = 2.

Thus, the integrated likelihood is more reasonable than the prole likelihood
for weighing the evidence that a given insider revealed a secret since the use
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of the latter would mean the revelation has no evidence to that eect even if
there were only two insiders.

The prole likelihood may nonetheless quantify

explanatory power, in which case the hypothesis that a given insider revealed the
secret would not explain its revelation better than would the hypothesis that he
or she did not reveal it.

3

Inference about imprecise hypotheses

Since the boundary between one composite hypothesis and another is often arbitrary to a large extent, the eect of specifying that boundary will be mitigated
by making it imprecise or, more technically, fuzzy. An objection against the use
of fuzzy logic is that problems solved using fuzzy set theory can be solved using
probability theory instead (Laviolette, 2004). However, whereas in the context
of statistical inference, probability is usually seen in terms of the representation
of uncertainty, there is no uncertainty associated with hypothesis specication
as envisioned here. Because the specication of hypotheses does not depend on
frequencies of events or levels of belief, fuzzy set membership functions rather
than probability distributions will be used to specify hypotheses in order to
avoid confusion. This approach is in line with traditional interpretations of degrees of set membership (Klir, 2004; Nguyen and Walker, 2000) as opposed to
reinterpreting them as degrees of uncertainty as per Singpurwalla and Booker
(2004). By keeping vagueness or imprecision distinct from uncertainty, fuzzy set
theory enables a clearer presentation of the proposed methodology than would
be possible with the probability calculus alone.

Thus, the proposed method-

ology remains objective in the sense that the strength of evidence for a given
hypothesis over another given hypothesis does not depend on any researcher's
prior levels of belief even though each given hypothesis may have an imprecise
specication.
The use of vague hypotheses to broaden the framework of Section 2 has a
dierent motivation than related work on the interface between statistics and
fuzzy logic. Fuzzy set theory has been used to specify vague hypotheses for generalizations of both Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing (Romer et al., 1995)
and Bayesian inference (Zadeh, 2002).

Similarly, Dollinger et al. (1996) sug-

gested measuring evidence by the extent to which a test statistic falls in a fuzzy
rejection region determined by a xed Type I error rate; this leads to fuzzy hypothesis tests and fuzzy condence intervals. Fuzzy hypothesis tests and fuzzy
condence intervals have also been formulated to overcome a aw in previous
methods involving discrete distributions (Geyer and Meeden, 2005).

3.1 Incomplete likelihood
A measure

P

of total mass

c =

R

dP

is a complete, incomplete, or strictly

incomplete probability distribution of completeness

0 < c < 1,

c

if

c = 1, 0 < c ≤ 1

or

respectively (Rényi, 1970, p. 569). Consider the family



Phθ0 ,c0 i : θ0 ∈ Θ, c0 ∈ (0, 1]

(3.1)
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of incomplete probability distributions on
where

0

θ,γ

0

, and

C

0

Ω

such that

are the interest parameter value, nuisance parameter value,

and level of completeness that uniquely specify
Denote each complete distribution
of which

x

Phθ0 ,1i by Pθ0 .

Phθ0 ,c0 i ,

the distribution of

X.

The true sampling distribution

Pθ with θ unknown.
e (•) = L
e (•; x) on Θ × (0, 1] satises
L
e (θ, c) = f (x; θ, c) for all hθ, ci ∈ Θ × (0, 1], where f (•; θ, c) is an incomplete
L
e (θ; x) = L
e (•, 1; x) is the
probability mass or density function of Phθ,ci . Thus, L
Fisherian or complete likelihood function . For all θ ∈ Θ and C ∈ (0, 1], the
e (θ, c; x) = cL
e (θ; x) follows from the parameterization of the sampling
identity L
model (3.1) since it requires that f (x; θ, c) = cf (x; θ, 1).

of the

X

Phθ0 ,c0 i (•) = c0 Phθ0 ,1i (•),

is modeled as a realization is

The incomplete likelihood function

3.2 Imprecise hypotheses
In order to concisely represent hypothesis imprecision in terms of incomplete
probability distributions, the subsection employs concepts from fuzzy set theory.

Denition 25.
of

Any measurable function that maps

Θ

to

[0, 1]

is a fuzzy subset

Θ.
Following Nguyen and Walker (2000), this denition makes no distinction

e 0 (θ) is considered to be
Θ
e 0.
˜Θ
of Θ, summarized as θ ∈

between a fuzzy subset and its membership function;
the extent to which
The

˜
∈

θ

0

belongs to a fuzzy subset

symbol plays the role of the

∈

e0
Θ

symbol in order to specify a hypothesis in

terms of membership in a fuzzy subset, which is literally a function rather than
a set of parameter values. The meaning of the hypothesis

e 0 (θ)
Θ

depends on whether

θ

e0
˜Θ
θ∈

is true to extent

is random according to the sampling model, as

will be seen in the remainder of this subsection. Each such

e0
Θ

corresponding to

F (Θ), the set of all fuzzy subsets of Θ such
0
0
e
e
that Θ ∈ F (Θ) =⇒ ∃θ ∈ Θ : Θ (θ) = 1.
0
If θ is random with sampling distribution p and if Θ ∈ A, then the general0
0
e
˜
ized probability of θ ∈Θ conditional on some event X ∈ Ω is dened as




e 0 |X ∈ Ω0 = E Θ
e 0 (θ) |X ∈ Ω0 ,
˜Θ
P̃ θ∈
a hypothesis must be a member of

where
where

P̃
E

P, an Rextension of Pθ and p, and
E (•) = •dP. By construction, P̃

generalizes the probability measure
is the usual expectation operator

obeys Bayes's rule:



e0
˜Θ
P̃ X ∈ Ω0 |θ∈

Accordingly, each





e 0 (θ) |X ∈ Ω0
E Θ


.
= Pθ (X ∈ Ω0 )
e 0 (θ)
E Θ



e0
˜Θ
P̃ X ∈ •|θ∈

such that

e 0 ∈ F (Θ)
Θ

is assumed to admit
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the generalized probability density or mass function


 
e0
fe •; ϕ
e Θ

E ϕ
e−1 (φ0 ) (θ) |X = x
fe(x; φ0 ) = E (f (x; θ))
E (ϕ
e−1 (φ0 ) (θ))
for all

x ∈ Ω

and

the invertible map

e , where Φ
e
φ0 ∈ Φ
e
ϕ
e : F → Φ. Then

satisfying


(3.2)

is a parameter set isomorphic to

for purposes of quantifying evidential weight and explanatory power is

e (•; x) = fe(x; •).
L

e0
˜Θ
θ∈

Thus, each composite hypothesis



e0

F

by

e
Φ
e (•) =
L

the generalized likelihood function on

corresponds to a



φ=ϕ
e Θ .
For the case of xed θ , every imprecise hypothesis is equivalent to a precise
D
E
 

e 0 (θ) and Ξ Θ
e 0 = ξ e 0 (θ) : θ ∈ Θ for all
hypothesis. Let ξ e 0 (θ) =
θ, Θ
Θ
Θ
 
0
0
e
e
Θ ∈ F (Θ). Every parameter value ξ in Ξ Θ indexes Pξ , a member of the
simple hypothesis

family of incomplete probability distributions (3.1). Each imprecise hypothesis

e 0 is called simple, intrinsically simple, or complex if the precise hypothesis
˜Θ
θ∈
 
e 0 is simple, intrinsically simple, or complex, respectively.
ξΘ
e 0 (θ) ∈ Ξ Θ
e 0 by distribution completeness values overcome the
˜Θ
These calibrations of θ ∈
objection against fuzzy set theory that it fails to unambiguously assign fractional
membership values (Lindley, 2004).

The calibrations facilitate the extension

of evidential theory to imprecise hypotheses by automatically attenuating the
weight of evidence and explanatory power according to the imprecision.

3.3 Extended theory of evidence
For fuzzy subsets

e 0, Θ
e 00 ∈ F (Θ),
Θ

weight of evidence in

X =x

let





e 0, Θ
e 00 ; x
e 0, Θ
e 00 = W
f Θ
f Θ
W

that supports

e0
˜Θ
θ∈

over

e 00 .
˜Θ
θ∈

denote the

The function

f
W

is dened by transforming each imprecise hypothesis concerning complete probability distributions to an equivalent precise hypothesis concerning incomplete
probability distributions in accordance with Section 3.2.

Denition 26.

A function

f
W

on

F (Θ) × F (Θ) × Ω is the extended evidential
ex if it satises the following

function with respect to an explanatory function

conditions:
1. For all

e 0, Θ
e 00 ∈ F (Θ)
Θ

such that

e0
˜Θ
θ∈

and

e 00
˜Θ
θ∈

is each either a simple

hypothesis or a complex hypothesis,



     
f Θ
e 0, Θ
e 00 ; x = W Ξ Θ
e0 , Ξ Θ
e 00 ; x ,
W
where

W

is any evidential function on
such that

e0
˜Θ
θ∈

2Θ×(0,1] × 2Θ×(0,1] × Ω.

e 00 are intrinsically simple
˜Θ
θ∈
n
o2
e ×Ω dened
hypotheses, let W be any evidential function on {φ} : φ ∈ Φ

2. For all

e 0, Θ
e 00 ∈ F (Θ)
Θ

(3.3)

and
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with

e
L

e . Then
Φ
n  o n  o 


e 00 ; x .
e0 , ϕ
f Θ
e 0, Θ
e 00 ; x = W
e Θ
ϕ
e Θ
W

as the likelihood function on

(3.4)

The general law of likelihood given by Proposition 7 is now extended to
govern imprecise hypotheses:

Proposition 27.
let

W

Extended law of likelihood . For any explanatory function

2Θ×(0,1] × 2Θ×(0,1] × Ω

denote the evidential function

Further, let

f
W

with respect to

denote the extended evidential function with respect to
e 0 over θ∈
e 00 is
˜Θ
˜Θ
X = x that supports θ∈

ex.

ex,
ex.

Then

the weight of evidence in



e0 0 e 0
f Θ
e 0, Θ
e 00 ; x = supθ0 ∈Θ Θ (θ ) L (θ ; x)
W
e 00 (θ00 ) L
e (θ00 ; x)
supθ00 ∈Θ Θ
for all fuzzy subsets

e 0, Θ
e 00 ∈ F (Θ)
Θ

such that

e0
˜Θ
θ∈

and

e 00
˜Θ
θ∈

(3.5)

is each either a

simple hypothesis or a complex hypothesis but is

R 0 0
R


e (θ ) dP (θ0 |X = x) /
Θ
0 e 00
f
e
W Θ ,Θ ;x = R
R
e 00 (θ00 ) dP (θ00 |X = x) /
Θ
for all

Θ0 ⊆ Θ

and

Θ00 ⊆ Θ

Proof. The case that

e0
˜Θ
θ∈

such that

and

e 00
˜Θ
θ∈

e0
˜Θ
θ∈

and

e 0 (θ0 ) dp (θ0 )
Θ
e 00 (θ00 ) dp (θ00 )
Θ

e 00
˜Θ
θ∈

(3.6)

are intrinsically simple.

are intrinsically simple hypotheses will be

addressed rst. Equations (3.4), (2.5) , and (3.2) yield





e 0 (θ) |X = x /E Θ
e 0 (θ)
E Θ
f Θ
e 0, Θ
e 00 ; x = 


,
W
e 00 (θ) |X = x /E Θ
e 00 (θ)
E Θ




from which equation (3.6) immediately follows.

e0
˜Θ
θ∈

and

Next consider the case that

e 00
˜Θ
θ∈

is each either a simple hypothesis or a complex hypothesis.
D
E
 
e 0 and θ∈
e 00 are thus shorthand for θ, Θ
e 0 (θ) ∈ Ξ Θ
e0
˜Θ
˜Θ
θ∈
D
E
 
e 00 (θ) ∈ Ξ Θ
e 00 , respectively (3.2). By Denition 26 and equation
θ, Θ

The hypotheses
and

(2.9),

Since



suphθ,Ci∈Ξ(Θ
e 0 ) L (hθ, Ci ; x)
f Θ
e 0, Θ
e 00 ; x =
W
.
suphθ,Ci∈Ξ(Θ
e 00 ) L (hθ, Ci ; x)
 
D
E
 
e 0 if and only if θ, Θ
e 0 (θ) ∈ Ξ Θ
e 0 , we have
hθ, Ci ∈ Ξ Θ
D
E 
e 0 (θ) ; x

supθ∈Θ L θ, Θ
f Θ
e 0, Θ
e 00 ; x =
D
E 
W
e 00 (θ) ; x
supθ∈Θ L θ, Θ
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L (h•i

 ; x)
0
e
e
L θ, Θ (θ) ; x ,

in terms of the likelihood function
of

L

D

E 
e 0 (θ) ; x
θ, Θ

and

on

Θ × (0, 1].

By the equivalence



e θ0 , Θ
e 0 (θ0 ) ; x
supθ0 ∈Θ L
f Θ
e 0, Θ
e 00 ; x =


W
e θ00 , Θ
e 00 (θ00 ) ; x
supθ00 ∈Θ L




e (•; x) on
L
e
e
Θ×(0, 1]. Using the identity L (θ, c; x) = cL (θ; x) of Section 3.1 for substitution
in terms of the (possibly reduced) incomplete likelihood function

completes the proof of equation (3.5).

In the presence of a nuisance parameter, the reduced likelihood function

e (•, C)
L

is formed by eliminating the nuisance parameter in order to approxi-

mate the weight of evidence, analogous to the precise hypothesis case of Section 2.5. Then each

e (θ, C)
L

is a function of the distributions indexed by the

same interest parameter value and with the same level of completeness but
not a function of other members of the family of incomplete probability distributions. The method of nuisance parameter elimination must also preserve

e (θ, C; x) = C L
e (θ, 1; x)
L

for all

θ ∈ Θ

and

C ∈ (0, 1].

The application of

equation (3.5) in the presence of a nuisance parameter is illustrated in Section
5.1.

4

Simulation study

To quantify the impact of replacing a simple hypothesis with a small-interval
composite hypothesis in evidential inference, a series of simulations were carried
out for the case of normal distributions (Example 22).

M = 105

independent

samples of independent standard normal observations were randomly generated
for each of 23 sample sizes from
each of size

n,

n = 2 to n = 10, 000.
b bans of evidence

and a threshold of

Given samples
for

θ 6= 0

over

x1 , ..., xM ,
θ = 0, the

probability of observing misleading evidence was computed by

00

α
bnΘ (b) =
with

M

1 X
1[10b ,∞) Wprofile R1 \Θ00 , Θ00 ; xi
M i=1

Θ00 = {0} for the composite-simple

hypothesis pair or with

(4.1)

Θ00 = [−1/10, 1/10]

for the composite- composite hypotheses pair. The levels of evidence were chosen

(b = 1/∞),
(b = 1/2), at least strong evidence (b = 1), at least
very strong evidence (b = 3/2), and decisive evidence (b = 2). Every observation of evidence favoring θ 6= 0 or |θ| > 1/10 at any level is misleading since the
data were generated under θ = 0.

to correspond to the probabilities of observing at least weak evidence
at least moderate evidence

The results are displayed as Figures 4.1-4.5, with one gure per level of
evidence. Figure 4.1 highlights the most obvious discrepancy between the two
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choices of hypothesis pairs. Since the maximum likelihood estimate almost never

θ 6= 0 over θ = 0 with probability 1. By contrast,
|θ| ≤ 1/10 over |θ| > 1/10, except for small samples.

equals 0, the evidence favors
the evidence usually favors

At the higher evidence grades, Figures 4.2-4.5 also show that the probability
of observing evidence for the incorrect hypothesis decreases as the sample size
increases for

00

Θ = {0},

Θ00 = [−1/10, 1/10],

as expected from Proposition 13, but not for

with the exception of smaller samples.

Figure 4.6 focuses on the comparison between and approximate evidence for
sample sizes common in experimental biology. Its plots for

n=5

and

n=6

are

directly relevant to the application of the next section.

5

Application to gene expression data

5.1 Evidence of dierential expression
In this section, the theory of Sections 2 and 3 is illustrated with tomato gene
expression data described in Alba et al. (2005). Dual-channel microarrays were
used to measure the mutant-to-wild-type expression ratios of

13, 440

the breaker stage of ripening and at 3 and 10 days thereafter.
later two stages has six biological replicates ( n

= 6),

genes at

Each of the

but one of the biological

replicates is missing at the breaker stage of ripening ( n

= 5).

For each of the three time points, there are two competing hypotheses per
gene:

the geometric mean of the expression ratio between mutant tomatoes

and wildtype tomatoes is either 1 (the simple hypothesis corresponding to no
mutation eect) or is not 1 (the composite hypothesis corresponding to a mutation eect). Since the data are approximately lognormal, the relevant family
of distributions for each gene

i

is that of equation (2.15), replacing

the logarithm of geometric mean of the expression ratio of the
replacing

x

with

xi ,

ith

θ

with

θi ,

gene, and

each component of which is the logarithm of an observed

expression ratio of the

ith

gene. The maximum likelihood estimate of

the sample mean of the logarithms of the expression ratios for the

θi

ith gene.

is

θbi ,

The

commonly made independence assumption of Section 2.4, although known to be
incorrect, remains a useful approximation in the absence of suciently large

n

to reliably estimate gene-gene interactions.
Like in the simulation study of the last section, equation (2.14) gives the
strength of evidence for dierential expression between the wild type and the
mutant

(θi 6= 0)

over equivalent expression

(θi = 0).

Since, however, the ex-

pression ratio is not exactly 1, Bickel (2004), Lewin et al. (2006), Van De Wiel
and Kim (2007), Bochkina and Richardson (2007), and McCarthy and Smyth
(2009) redened what is meant by "dierential expression" by employing some
biologically relevant value

θ+ > 0.

Accordingly, equation (2.14) also yields the
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Figure 4.1: Probabilities
misleading

positive

hypothesis that

{0}

α
bn (1/∞)

and

[−1/10,1/10]

α
bn

(1/∞) of observing any
θ 6= 0 over the "simple"
|θ| > 1/10 over the "compos-

evidence for the hypothesis that

θ = 0 and for the hypothesis
|θ| ≤ 1/10, respectively.

that

ite" hypothesis that
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Figure 4.2: Probabilities
ing

{0}

[−1/10,1/10]

α
bn (1/2) and α
bn

moderate or stronger

"simple" hypothesis that

(1/2) of observing misleadθ 6= 0 over the
hypothesis that |θ| > 1/10 over

evidence for the hypothesis that

θ = 0

and for the

|θ| ≤ 1/10, respectively. The horizontal gray
{0}
limn→∞,M →∞ α
bn (1/2) according to the χ2 distribution with
[−1/10,1/10]
freedom; limn→∞,M →∞ α
bn
(1/2) = 0 by Proposition 13.

the "composite" hypothesis that
line is drawn at

1

degree of
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Figure 4.3: Probabilities

{0}

α
bn (1)

and

[−1/10,1/10]

α
bn

(1)

of observing misleading

strong, very strong, or decisive evidence for the hypothesis that θ 6= 0 over
the "simple" hypothesis that

θ = 0 and for the hypothesis
|θ| ≤ 1/10, respectively.

that

|θ| > 1/10

over

the "composite" hypothesis that
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Figure 4.4: Probabilities
ing

{0}

very strong or decisive

"simple" hypothesis that

[−1/10,1/10]

α
bn (3/2) and α
bn

(3/2) of observing misleadθ 6= 0 over the
hypothesis that |θ| > 1/10 over the

evidence for the hypothesis that

θ = 0 and for the
|θ| ≤ 1/10, respectively.

"composite" hypothesis that
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Figure 4.5: Probabilities

decisive
sis that

{0}

α
bn (2)

and

[−1/10,1/10]

α
bn

(2) of observing misleading
θ =
6 0 over the "simple" hypothethat |θ| > 1/10 over the "composite"

evidence for the hypothesis that

θ = 0

hypothesis that

and for the hypothesis

|θ| ≤ 1/10,

respectively.
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{0}

[−1/10,1/10]

α
bn (b) and α
bn
(b) of observing misleading
evidence for the hypothesis that θ 6= 0 over the "simple" hypothesis that θ = 0
and for the hypothesis that |θ| > 1/10 over the "composite" hypothesis that
|θ| ≤ 1/10, respectively, for each of the evidence levels b of Figures 1-5 and at
each of three sample sizes (n ∈ {4, 5, 6}).
Figure 4.6: Probabilities
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strength of evidence for biologically signicant dierential expression between
the wild type and the mutant

(|θi | ≤ θ+ ).

ential expression
biochemistry,

θ+

(|θi | > θ+ )

over biologically insignicant dier-

Due to the importance of the twofold change in

is here set to

1
2

log 2,

the midpoint between

0 and log 2.

(Simi-

larly, Lewin et al. (2006) and Bochkina and Richardson (2007) derived posterior
probabilities that

|θi | > log 2,

and Bickel (2004), Van De Wiel and Kim (2007),

and McCarthy and Smyth (2009) considered false discovery rates for which a
"discovery" is dened in terms of fold change thresholds.)
As seen in Figure 5.1, the use of

|θi | > log

√

2 rather

than

|θi | > 0 as

the hy-

pothesis corresponding to dierential expression leads to considering many fewer
genes dierentially expressed at each stage of maturity and at each level of evidence. Now the composite hypotheses for gene
and

θi ∈ Θ00

√
√ 

= − log 2, log 2 .

√ 
√

i are θi ∈ Θ0 = R1 \ − log 2, log 2

There is an order of magnitude more

genes counted as dierentially expressed at each evidence grade when using


Wprofile R1 \ {0} , {0} ; xi than when using Wprofile (Θ0 , Θ00 ; xi )
of evidence in xi , the data for the ith gene.

as the strength

The left-hand-side of Figure 5.2 stresses the main limitation of comparing two

θ+ , the value
(|θi | ≤ θ+ )
√
= log 2. By instead

composite hypotheses: the results depend on the specication of

that determines the sharp boundary between equivalent expression
and dierential expression

(|θi | > θ+ ) ;

in this case,

θ+

allowing degrees of whether a gene is dierentially expressed, the approach of
Section 3 mitigates this eect. For correspondence with the above analyses with
precise hypotheses, a gene is considered dierentially expressed to extent

e 0 (θ) =
Θ

(
|θ| / log 2 |θ| ≤ log 2
1
|θ| > log 2

and equivalently expressed to extent
ure 5.3.

e 00 (θ) = 1 − Θ
e 0 (θ),
Θ

as illustrated in Fig-

Sokhansanj et al. (2004) instead considered a fuzzy subset on gene

expression measurements that would only achieve full expression membership
for innite measurements.

By contrast,

e0
Θ

considers all genes with two-fold

or greater dierential expression between populations to be fully dierentially
expressed.
The success in eliminating the undesirable discontinuity at the rigid boundary between hypotheses is evident from the right-hand-side of Figure 5.2, which
displays



fprofile Θ
e 0, Θ
e 00 ; xi ,
W

the result of putting the prole likelihood func-

tion in place of likelihood function in equation (3.5), against

 
exp θbi ,

the

maximum likelihood estimate of the expression ratio. Although the strength of
evidence still changes sign at

θbi = ± log

√

2,

no trace remains of what resembles

a phase transition at those points in the precise hypothesis case.
The replacement of

fprofile (Θ0 , Θ00 ; xi )
W

with



fprofile Θ
e 0, Θ
e 00 ; xi
W

impact on inference for a large portion of the genes (Figure 5.4).

has high
Levels of

evidence between 0 and 2 are most important for nding genes with evidence of
dierential expression since negative levels correspond to evidence for equivalent
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expression, and levels above 2 normally indicate decisive evidence for dierential
expression regardless of whether precise or imprecise hypotheses are specied.

5.2 Comparison to empirical Bayes
The theoretical null version of the empirical Bayes model of Efron (2007), when
applied to data structured as in Section 5.1, assumes the Student t statistic

T (Xi )

f (•; 1) if gene i is dierentially expressed, which
and f (•; 0) if gene i is equivalently expressed,
which occurs with probability π (0), where f (•; 0) is the Student t density with
n − 1 degrees of freedom. Thus, θi ∈ {0, 1} has probability distribution π for
each i without implying that changes in θi could really be detected over repeated
has probability density

occurs with probability

π (1),

experiments (2.4.3).
On the basis of the 10-day microarrays for the 7139 genes with complete data

(n = 6), the probability mass function π was estimated by π̂ and the probability
density function f (•; 1) by fˆ (•; 1), with both estimators dened by the method
of Efron (2007). Then

ŵ (1, 0; T (xi )) =

fˆ (T (xi ) ; 1)
f (T (xi ) ; 0)

is an approximate Bayes factor according to its role in approximating posterior

ŵ (1, 0; T (xi )) is
θi = 1 over θi = 0

probabilities by estimated local false discovery rates. Herein,
instead employed as an estimate of the weight of evidence for
as dened by the special law of likelihood.
Figure 5.5 compares
of the xed-parameter


log10 Wprofile R1 \ {0} , {0} ; xi and log10 Wprofile (Θ0 , Θ00 ; xi )
model (5.1) to log10 ŵ (1, 0; T (xi )). The discrepancies

stem largely from dierences in model assumptions.

In the xed-parameter

model but not in the empirical Bayes model, the expression data are lognormally distributed even in the case of dierential expression. More importantly,
the empirical Bayes constrains the reciprocal of the coecient of variation of the
logarithmic expression ratios to either 0 or to a single value common to all differentially expressed genes, whereas the xed-parameter model allows the coecient of variation to vary from one dierentially expressed gene to another. The
reversals of evidence between

log10 Wprofile (Θ0 , Θ00 ; xi )

and

log10 ŵ (1, 0; T (xi ))

(plotted as the gray circles) arise from a dierence in hypotheses: the former
compares complex hypotheses about the mean, whereas the latter compares
simple hypotheses about the coecient of variation.
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[− log

√

√

2]
(b) and α
bn
(b) of observing misleading
evidence for the hypothesis that θi 6= 0 over the "simple" hypothesis that θi =
√
0 and for the hypothesis
that |θi | > log
2 over the "composite" hypothesis
√
that |θi | ≤ log
2, respectively, for each of the evidence levels of Figures 1-5
(b ∈ {1/∞, 1/2, 1, 3/2, 2}) and at each of three stages of maturity (0, 3, and
{0}
Figure 5.1: Probabilities α
bn

2,log

10 days after the breaker stage of ripening). These proportions were computed
using equation (4.1), but with
ratios for the

ith

xi as the vector of the logarithms of the expression
M as the number of genes that have sucient

gene and with

data for the computation of likelihood ratios.

6

Closing remarks

6.1 Highlights and discussion
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 axiomatically dened the evidential function
to uniquely weigh the evidence in observation
another hypothesis

θ ∈ Θ00 . W

x

for a hypothesis

W in order
θ ∈ Θ0 over

applies not only to simple hypotheses, but also

to composite hypotheses, including complex hypotheses about xed parameter values and intrinsically simple hypotheses about random parameter values.
Properly distinguishing between the nuisance parameter problem and the composite hypothesis problem in Section 2.5 avoids pathologies of the prole likelihood without resorting to the representation of evidence by intervals of prole
likelihoods. The proposed framework compares favorably with Bayesianism in
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Figure 5.2: The weight of evidence for dierential expression over equivalent expression plotted against the maximum likelihood estimate of the expression ratio
for the tomato data at 10 days after the breaker stage of ripening. The vertical
gray lines are drawn at the boundary that separates the two precise hypotheses,
reecting the idea that a gene is either dierentially expressed or is equivalently
expressed, with no possibility of something in between.

By contrast, the im-

precise hypotheses have no rigid boundary between dierential expression and
equivalent expression. Darker circles represent genes that correspond to higher
values of

 
e 0 θbi − 1
2Θ

and that thus seem to be more closely aligned with ei-

ther one imprecise hypothesis or the other, whereas lighter circles correspond
to more borderline genes.

 
e 0 θbi
Θ

estimates

e 0 (θi ),
Θ

the degree to which the

ith

gene is dierentially expressed.
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Figure 5.3: The degree of the truth of each imprecise hypothesis plotted against

eθ , the geometric mean of the expression ratio in the population. The black curve
e 0 , and the gray curve represents Θ
e 00 . The vertical lines correspond
represents Θ
0
00
to the boundary between the precise hypotheses Θ and Θ . Degrees of truth
are calibrated by Denition 26.
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Figure

5.4:

Eects

of

replacing

the

precise

cise hypotheses for the data of Figure 5.2.



e 0, Θ
e 00 ; xi
Wprofile Θ
has



hypotheses

with

the

impre-

The left-hand-side displays

Wprofile (Θ0 , Θ00 ; xi ), and the right-hand-side

 
e 0, Θ
e 00 ; xi against Θ
e 0 θbi , the estimated exΘ

plotted against

Wprofile (Θ0 , Θ00 ; xi ) − Wprofile



tent of dierential expression. The grayscale is the same as that of Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.5: The weight of evidence for dierential gene expression under the
xed-parameter model versus the Bayes factor under the empirical Bayes model
for all genes with 6 ratios available.

Each gray circle and each black circle

represents a dierent gene. The diagonal is the line of equality.
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Example 10 because the former but not the latter satises the idealized principle
of inference to the best explanation (2.2.1). The evidential weight

W (Θ0 , Θ00 ; x)

is consistent, coherent, and interpretable, as seen in Sections 2.3 and 4. These
properties warrant consideration of a new approach to simultaneous inference,
multiple comparisons, and sequential analysis (2.4).
Incomplete probability distributions represent imprecision in hypotheses to
mitigate the eect of hypothesis boundaries on the weight of evidence, as illustrated in the gene expression application (3, 5). Nonetheless, making hypotheses imprecise will sometimes insuciently reduce the dependence of the
weight of evidence on arbitrarily selected parameter values. In such settings, the
use of two composite hypotheses separated by a non-arbitrary boundary entirely
eliminates such dependence. In the gene expression illustration of Section 5, the
weight of evidence for biologically signicant dierential expression
versus biologically insignicant dierential expression

(|θi | ≤ θ+ )

(|θi | > θ+ )
would then

be replaced by the weight of evidence for overexpression/upregulation
versus underexpression/downregulation

(θi < 0),

(θi > 0)

either superseding or comple-

menting an application of decision theory to the latter two hypotheses (Bickel,
2010).

6.2 Opportunities for further research
6.2.1 Additional models and applications
The laws of likelihood oer an evidential framework that invites examination
of their practical eects on statistical inference.

The examination of normal

variates of Section 4 concentrated on the probability of observing misleading
evidence for a composite hypothesis over an interval hypothesis, nding that it
is often much less than that for a composite hypothesis over a simple hypothesis.
The microarray case study of Section 5 quantied the impact on evidential inference of replacing simple hypotheses with interval hypotheses and of replacing
precise hypotheses with imprecise hypotheses.
The proposed framework may be further examined for other families of distributions and for other applications. In particular, the ndings of Sections 2.3.3
and 3 suggest a fresh approach to bioequivalence studies in which researchers
seek to determine whether the evidence favors an interval hypothesis over a
composite hypothesis without requiring an articially precise specication of
the largest eect size considered equivalent.

6.2.2 Robust evidential inference
There remains ample opportunity for research to make evidential inference about
composite hypotheses robust to unanticipated data distributions. Possible solutions may utilize robust adjusted likelihood functions, contamination mixture
models, or nonparametric approaches, all of which require at least moderately
large samples. Each strategy will be discussed in turn.
A likelihood function adjustment designed to make the law of likelihood less
sensitive to model misspecication (Royall and Tsou, 2003; Blume et al., 2007)
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might be used for robust inference under the general law of likelihood. The resulting robust adjusted likelihood function performs well under certain violations
of the working model and yet retains full asymptotic eciency if the working
model is correct (Royall and Tsou, 2003). Since the adjustment improves both
Neyman-Pearson and Bayesian uses of the likelihood function (Royall and Tsou,
2003), the adjustment is expected to improve evidential inference regarding composite hypotheses as well.
A more classical approach to making the likelihood function robust against

{f (•; θ) : θ ∈ Θ} with a mixture
{(1 − ε) f (•; θ) + εg (•; γ) : θ ∈ Θ}, where ε is the unknown probability
of contamination and g is the contamination density or mass function parameterized by γ (Aitkin and Wilson, 1980). It may be advisable to extend this
potential outliers replaces the working model

model

methodology to evidential inference about simple hypotheses before attempting
to generalize it to handle precise and imprecise composite hypotheses.
The empirical likelihood version of equation (2.9) is

W (S 0 , S 00 ) = sup L (F 0 ; x) / sup L (F 00 ; x) ,
F 0 ∈S 0

F 00 ∈S 00

L (•; x) is the nonparametric likelihood function (Owen, 2001) and where
S 00 are broad sets of distributions corresponding to dierent hypotheses
0
00
distinguished by their constraints, e.g., S and S may be large families of distriwhere

S0

and

bution with means outside or inside some interval, respectively. Zhang (2009a)
studied the simple hypothesis case

W ({F 0 } , {F 00 }) = L (F 0 ; x) /L (F 00 ; x).

Equa-

tion (3.5) may be analogously modied by replacing the parametric likelihood
function with the nonparametric likelihood function and constraint satisfaction
with partial constraint satisfaction indicated by the membership functions of
fuzzy sets.

Acknowledgments
I warmly thank an Associate Editor and three anonymous reviewers for helpful
comments and especially for several interesting examples , a criticism of my
initial set of axioms, and guidance on plotting one of the gures.

I am also

grateful to Jerey Blume for an enlightening discussion on evidence, multiple
comparisons, and Bayesianism.

Xuemei Tang provided the fruit development

microarray data.
This work was partially supported by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada
and by the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Ottawa.

Computations

were performed in R (R Development Core Team, 2008), the Biobase package
of Bioconductor (Gentleman et al., 2004) facilitated data management, and the
locfdr package of CRAN (Efron, 2007).

47

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

References
Aitkin, M., 1991. Posterior Bayes factors. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological) 53 (1), 111142.
Aitkin, M., Wilson, G. T., 1980. Mixture models, outliers, and the em algorithm.
Technometrics 22 (3), 325331.
Alba, R., Payton, P., Fei, Z., McQuinn, R., Debbie, P., Martin, G. B., Tanksley,
S. D., Giovannoni, J. J., 2005. Transcriptome and selected metabolite analyses
reveal multiple points of ethylene control during tomato fruit development.
Plant Cell 17 (11), 29542965.
Barnard, G. A., 1967. The use of the likelihood function in statistical practice.
Proc. 5th Berkeley Symp. on Math. Stat. Prob., Vol. I, 2740.
Benjamini, Y., Drai, D., Elmer, G., Kafka, N., Golani, I., 2001. Controlling the
false discovery rate in behavior genetics research. Behavioural brain research
125 (1-2), 279284.
Benjamini, Y., Hochberg, Y., 2000. On the adaptive control of the false discovery
rate in multiple testing with independent statistics. Journal of Educational
and Behavioral Statistics 25 (1), 6083.
Benjamini, Y., Liu, W., 1999. A step-down multiple hypotheses testing procedure that controls the false discovery rate under independence. Journal of
Statistical Planning and Inference 82 (1-2), 163170.
Benjamini, Y., Yekutieli, D., 2005. Quantitative trait loci analysis using the
false discovery rate. Genetics 171 (2), 783790.
Berger, J. O., 2004. The case for objective Bayesian analysis. Bayesian Analysis
1, 117.
Berger, J. O., Liseo, B., Wolpert, R. L., 1999. Integrated likelihood methods for
eliminating nuisance parameters. Statistical Science 14 (1), 128.
Berger, J. O., Wolpert, R. L., 1988. The likelihood principle 2nd edition. The
Likelihood Principle.
Bernardo, J. M., 1979. Reference posterior distributions for Bayesian inference.
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society.Series B (Methodological) 41 (2), 113
147.
Bernardo, J. M., 1997. Noninformative priors do not exist: A discussion. Journal
of Statistical Planning and Inference 65, 159189.
Bickel, D. R., 2004. Degrees of dierential gene expression: Detecting biologically signicant expression dierences and estimating their magnitudes. Bioinformatics (Oxford, England) 20, 682688.

48

http://biostats.bepress.com/cobra/art71

Bickel, D. R., 2008. The strength of statistical evidence for composite hypotheses with an application to multiple comparisons. Technical Report, Ottawa
Institute of Systems Biology, COBRA Preprint Series, Article 49, available at
biostats.bepress.com/cobra/ps/art49.
Bickel, D. R., 2010. Estimating the null distribution to adjust observed condence levels for genome-scale screening. To appear in Biometrics, 2009 draft
available at arXiv:0910.0745.
Blume, J. D., 2002. Likelihood methods for measuring statistical evidence.
Statistics in Medicine 21 (17), 25632599.
Blume, J. D., 2008. How often likelihood ratios are misleading in sequential
trials. Communications in Statistics - Theory and Methods 37 (8), 11931206.
Blume, J. D., Su, L., Olveda, R. M., McGarvey, S. T., 2007. Statistical evidence
for glm regression parameters:

A robust likelihood approach. Statistics in

Medicine 26 (15), 29192936.
Bochkina, N., Richardson, S., 2007. Tail posterior probability for inference in
pairwise and multiclass gene expression data. Biometrics 63 (4), 11171125.
Choi, L., Cao, B., Rohde, C., 2008. A survey of the likelihood approach to
bioequivalence trials. Statistics in Medicine 27 (24), 48744894.
Clyde, M., George, E. I., 2004. Model uncertainty. Statistical Science 19 (1),
8194.
Cox, D. R., 1977. The role of signicance tests. Scandinavian Journal of Statistics 4, 4970.
Cox, D. R., 2006. Principles of Statistical Inference. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
de Finetti, B., 1970. Theory of Probability: a Critical Introductory Treatment,
1st Edition. John Wiley and Sons Ltd, New York.
Dempster, A. P., 1997. The direct use of likelihood for signicance testing.
Statistics and Computing 7 (4), 247252.
Dollinger, M. B., Kulinskaya, E., Staudte, R. G., 1996. Information, Statistics
and Induction in Science. World Scientic, Singapore, Ch. Fuzzy hypothesis
tests and condence intervals, pp. 119128.
Edwards, A. W. F., 1992. Likelihood. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore.
Efron, B., 2007. Size, power and false discovery rates. Annals of Statistics 35,
13511377.
Efron, B., Tibshirani, R., 1998. The problem of regions. Annals of Statistics
26 (5), 16871718.

49

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

Fisher, R. A., 1925. Statistical Methods for Research Workers. Oliver and Boyd,
London.
Fisher, R. A., 1973. Statistical Methods and Scientic Inference. Hafner Press,
New York.
Foster, J., 2004. Readings on Laws of Nature. University of Pitsburg Press,
Pitsburg, Ch. Induction, explanation, and natural necessity.
Fraser, D. A. S., 2009. Is Bayes posterior just quick and dirty condence? Technical Report, Department of Statistics, University of Toronto.
Fraser, D. A. S., Reid, N., Wong, A. C. M., 2004. Inference for bounded parameters. Physical Review D 69 (3).
Gentleman, R. C., Carey, V. J., Bates, D. M., Bolstad, B., Dettling, M., Dudoit,
S., Ellis, B., Gautier, L., Ge, Y., Gentry, J., Hornik, K., Hothorn, T., Huber,
W., Iacus, S., Irizarry, R., Leisch, F., Li, C., Maechler, M., Rossini, A. J.,
Sawitzki, G., Smith, C., Smyth, G., Tierney, L., Yang, J. Y. H., Zhang, J.,
2004. Bioconductor: Open software development for computational biology
and bioinformatics. Genome Biology 5, R80.
Geyer, C. J., Meeden, G. D., 2005. Fuzzy and randomized condence intervals
and p-values. Statistical Science 20 (4), 358366.
Goodman, S. N., 1998. Multiple comparisons, explained. American Journal of
Epidemiology 147 (9), 807812.
Goodman, S. N., Royall, R., 1988. Evidence and scientic research. American
Journal of Public Health 78 (12), 15681574.
Hacking, I., 1965. Logic of Statistical Inference. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Hald, A., 2007. A History of Parametric Statistical Inference from Bernoulli to
Fisher, 1713-1935. Springer, New York.
He, Y., Huang, W., Liang, H., 2007. Axiomatic development of prole likelihoods as the strength of evidence for composite hypotheses. Communications
in Statistics - Theory and Methods 36 (15), 26952706.
Hoch, J. S., Blume, J. D., 2008. Measuring and illustrating statistical evidence
in a cost-eectiveness analysis. Journal of Health Economics 27 (2), 476495.
Jereys, H., 1948. Theory of Probability. Oxford University Press, London.
Johnstone, D. J., 1986. Tests of signicance in theory and practice (with discussion). The Statistician 35, 491504.
Kalbeisch, J. D., 2000. Comment on R. Royall, "on the probability of observing misleading statistical evidence". Journal of the American Statistical
Association 95 (451), 770771.

50

http://biostats.bepress.com/cobra/art71

Kalbeisch, J. D., Sprott, D. A., 1970. Application of likelihood methods to
models involving large numbers of parameters. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society. Series B (Methodological) 32 (2), 175208.
Kardaun, O. J. W. F., Salomé, D., Schaafsma, W., Steerneman, A. G. M.,
Willems, J. C., Cox, D. R., 2003. Reections on fourteen cryptic issues concerning the nature of statistical inference. International Statistical Review /
Revue Internationale de Statistique 71 (2), 277303.
Kass, R. E., Raftery, A. E., 1995. Bayes factors. Journal of the American Statistical Association 90 (430), 773795.
Kass, R. E., Wasserman, L., 1996. The selection of prior distributions by formal
rules. Journal of the American Statistical Association 91, 13431370.
Klir, G. J., 2004. Generalized information theory:

Aims, results, and open

problems. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 85 (1-3), 2138.
Korn, E. L., Freidlin, B., 2006. The likelihood as statistical evidence in multiple
comparisons in clinical trials: No free lunch. Biometrical Journal 48 (3), 346
355.
Kyburg, H. E., Teng, C. M., 2001. Uncertain Inference. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Kyburg, H. E., Teng, C. M., 2006. Nonmonotonic logic and statistical inference.
Computational Intelligence 22 (1), 2651.
Lavine, M., Schervish, M. J., 1999. Bayes factors: What they are and what they
are not. American Statistician 53 (2), 119122.
Laviolette, M., 2004. Comment on n. d. singpurwalla and j. m. booker, 'membership functions and probability measures of fuzzy sets'. Journal of the American
Statistical Association 99 (467), 879880.
Lehmann, E., 2006. On likelihood ratio tests. IMS Lecture Notes-monograph
Series 49, 18.
Lele, S. R., 2004. The Nature of Scientic Evidence:

statistical, philosophi-

cal, and empirical considerations. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ch.
Evidence functions and the optimality of the law of likelihood, pp. 191216.
Lewin, A., Richardson, S., Marshall, C., Glazier, A., Aitman, T., 2006. Bayesian
modeling of dierential gene expression. Biometrics 62 (1), 19.
Lindley, D. V., 2004. Comment on n.d. singpurwalla and j.m. booker, 'membership functions and probability measures of fuzzy sets'. Journal of the American
Statistical Association 99 (467), 877879.
MacKay, D. J., 2002. Information Theory, Inference and Learning Algorithms.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

51

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

Mayo, D. G., Cox, D. R., 2006. Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference. IMS Lecture Notes - Monograph Series, The Second Erich L.
Lehmann Symposium - Optimality.
McCarthy, D. J., Smyth, G. K., 2009. Testing signicance relative to a foldchange threshold is a TREAT. Bioinformatics 25 (6), 765771.
Montazeri, Z., Yanofsky, C. M., Bickel, D. R., 2010. Shrinkage estimation of
eect sizes as an alternative to hypothesis testing followed by estimation in
high-dimensional biology: Applications to dierential gene expression. Statistical Applications in Genetics and Molecular Biology 9, 23.
Nguyen, H. T., Walker, E. A., 2000. A First Course in Fuzzy Logic. CRC Press,
London.
Niiniluoto, I., 2004. Induction and Deduction in the Sciences. Springer, New
York.
Osteyee, D. B., Good, I. J., 1974. Information, Weight of Evidence, the Singularity between Probability Measures and Signal Detection. Springer-Verlag,
New York.
Owen, A. B., 2001. Empirical Likelihood. Chapman and Hall/CRC, London.
Pasterkamp, R. J., Peschon, J. J., Spriggs, M. K., Kolodkin, A. L., 2003.
Semaphorin 7a promotes axon outgrowth through integrins and mapks. Nature 424 (6947), 398405.
Polansky, A. M., 2007. Observed Condence Levels: Theory and Application.
Chapman and Hall, New York.
Pollard, K. S., Dudoit, S., van der Laan, M. J., 2005. Multiple testing procedures:

The multtest package and applications to genomics. Bioinformatics

and Computational Biology Solutions Using R and Bioconductor, 249271.
Popper, K., 2002. Logic of Scientic Discovery. Routledge, London.
R Development Core Team, 2008. R: A language and environment for statistical
computing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria.
Rényi, A., 1970. Probability Theory. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Robbins, H., 1970. Statistical methods related to the law of the iterated logarithm. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 41 (5), 13971409.
Romer, C., Kandel, A., Backer, E., 1995. Fuzzy partitions of the sample space
and fuzzy parameter hypotheses. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and
Cybernetics 25 (9), 13141322.
Royall, R., 1992. The elusive concept of statistical evidence. Bayesian Statistics
4, 405418.

52

http://biostats.bepress.com/cobra/art71

Royall, R., 1997. Statistical Evidence: A Likelihood Paradigm. CRC Press, New
York.
Royall, R., 2000a. On the probability of observing misleading statistical evidence. Journal of the American Statistical Association 95 (451), 760768.
Royall, R., 2000b. Rejoinder to comments on r. royall, "on the probability of
observing misleading statistical evidence". Journal of the American Statistical
Association 95 (451), 773780.
Royall, R., Tsou, T.-S., 2003. Interpreting statistical evidence by using imperfect
models: Robust adjusted likelihood functions. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society. Series B 65 (2), 391404.
Savage, L. J., 1954. The Foundations of Statistics. John Wiley and Sons, New
York.
Schervish, M. J., 1996. P values: What they are and what they are not. American Statistician 50 (3), 203206.
Severini, T., 2010. Likelihood ratio statistics based on an integrated likelihood.
Biometrika 97 (2), 481496.
Severini, T. A., 2007. Integrated likelihood functions for non-Bayesian inference.
Biometrika 94 (3), 529542.
Shaer, J. P., 1995. Multiple hypothesis testing. Annual Review of Psychology
46 (1), 561584.
Singpurwalla, N. D., Booker, J. M., 2004. Membership functions and probability measures of fuzzy sets. Journal of the American Statistical Association
99 (467), 867877.
Sokhansanj, B. A., Fitch, J. P., Quong, J. N., Quong, A. A., 2004. Linear fuzzy
gene network models obtained from microarray data by exhaustive search.
BMC Bioinformatics 5.
Spicer, L. J., Francisco, C. C., 1997. The adipose obese gene product, leptin:
Evidence of a direct inhibitory role in ovarian function. Endocrinology 138 (8),
33743379.
Spjøtvoll, E., 1977. Comment on d. r. cox, 'the role of signicance tests'. Scandinavian Journal of Statistics 4, 6366.
Storey, J. D., 2002. A direct approach to false discovery rates. Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society. Series B: Statistical Methodology 64 (3), 479498.
Strug, L. J., Hodge, S. E., 2006. An alternative foundation for the planning and
evaluation of linkage analysis. ii. implications for multiple test adjustments.
Human Heredity 61 (4), 200209.

53

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

Strug, L. J., Rohde, C. A., Corey, P. N., 2007. An introduction to evidential
sample size calculations. American Statistician 61 (3), 207212.
Tsou, T.-S., Royall, R., 1995. Robust likelihoods. Journal of the American Statistical Association 90, 316320.
Van De Wiel, M. A., Kim, K. I., 2007. Estimating the false discovery rate using
nonparametric deconvolution. Biometrics 63 (3), 806815.
Van der Laan, M. J., Dudoit, S., Pollard, K. S., 2004. Augmentation procedures
for control of the generalized family-wise error rate and tail probabilities for
the proportion of false positives. Stat. Appl. in Genet. and Mol. Biol. 3, 15.
Westfall, P. H., Johnson, W. O., Utts, J. M., 1997. A Bayesian perspective on
the bonferroni adjustment. Biometrika 84 (2), 419427.
Wilkinson, G. N., 1977. On resolving the controversy in statistical inference
(with discussion). Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological) 39 (2), 119171.
Wright, S. P., 1992. Adjusted p-values for simultaneous inference. Biometrics
48 (4), 10051013.
Yanofsky, C. M., Bickel, D. R., 2010. Validation of dierential gene expression algorithms: Application comparing fold-change estimation to hypothesis
testing. BMC Bioinformatics 11, 63.
Yekutieli, D., Reiner-Benaim, A., Benjamini, Y., Elmer, G. I., Kafka, N.,
Letwin, N. E., Lee, N. H., 2006. Approaches to multiplicity issues in complex
research in microarray analysis. Statistica Neerlandica 60 (4), 414437.
Zadeh, L. A., 2002. Toward a perception-based theory of probabilistic reasoning
with imprecise probabilities. Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference
105 (1), 233264.
Zhang, Z., 2009a. Interpreting statistical evidence with empirical likelihood functions. Biometrical Journal 51, 710720.
Zhang, Z., 2009b. A law of likelihood for composite hypotheses. arXiv:0901.0463.

54

http://biostats.bepress.com/cobra/art71

